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Human beings are social animals. In our daily lives, we spend a large amount of time with others. 
Necessarily, we often coordinate our actions with the actions of people around us, which is an 
essential part of successful social interactions (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). To be able 
to carry a heavy object together, to cook with a friend, or to play tennis you need to know how 
your interaction partner moves to respond appropriately, otherwise you will most likely fail to 
reach the intended goal. Verbal and non-verbal communication thereby plays an important role 
during these interactions. Human beings are extremely good in perceiving, predicting, and 
understanding non-verbal signals by automatically imitating movements and expressions of 
others (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). This enables us to feel what others feel (e.g., Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992, 1994).  
In the literature, the coordination of actions of two (or more) people in time and space is 
called joint action. The literature suggests a common coding system of perceived and executed 
actions: action observation leads to automatic activation of motor representations in the observer 
(e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Prinz, 1997; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005), a phenomenon called 
co-presentation of action. Thus, seemingly, the human brain is specialised to perceive, interpret, 
and respond to non-verbal cues of other people in our environment (e.g., Chartrand & van 
Baaren, 2009).   
However, we are also constantly surrounded by non-living objects with which we 
communicate and that are supposed to help us: whether we use our computers, smart phones, the 
interactive navigation system, or the coffee maker, we interact with non-living objects and this 
array of technology and virtual agents expands constantly. Interactions with these objects steadily 
gain importance in our society. Therefore, it will become increasingly important to explore how 
our interactions with these objects can be optimised.  
It has been shown that people automatically ascribe human attributes and intentionality to 
objects to make sense of their „behaviour“. This happens especially when the objects‘ features 
are human-like (e.g., Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Krach et al., 2008). This phenomenon is 
called anthropomorphism. When the computer does not work as it should, we may say something 
like „He is not in a good mood today“ or we assume that he wants to annoy us. At the same time, 
we feel better understood by non-human agents if anthropomorphic features increase (e.g., 
Burgoon et al., 2000). We behave as if objects are living entities. But when our interactions with 
machines resemble interactions with other humans, this raises the question how we co-represent 
actions of non-biological agents in order to succeed in our interactions with them and thereby 
reach our goals. Is it possible that we co-represent actions of objects the same way we co-
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represent human actions? And do objects and non-human agents influence our social behaviour 
when we perceive them as human-like agents?  
The present dissertation seeks to clarify the question how humans co-represent the actions 
of non-human agents, and what the social moderators are that influence action co-representation 
of non-biological agents. We show that when we perceive a non-human agent as intentionally 
acting person these actions are co-represented in the same way as we co-represent human actions. 
Additionally, it is demonstrated that whether we perceive an interaction partner as in-group 
respectively out-group member, and the ability to take the perspective of the interaction partner, 
both have an influence on co-representation of action, which in turn has consequences on 
meaningful social behaviour. In the following sections of this introduction, a theoretical 
framework of the key concepts of this dissertation will be given. Subsequently, a summary will 
be provided of each of the chapters of this dissertation. Finally, the key findings and suggestions 
for further research will be highlighted.   
Action co-representation 
William James already suggested that "we may lay it down for certain that every mental 
representation of a movement awakens to some degree the actual movement which is its object." 
(James, 1890). Thus, before we perform an action we have the appropriate representation in our 
mind that activates the corresponding motor movement. In social situations, we often observe 
actions of others that can trigger the corresponding movement. Thus, extended to joint action 
situations in which two people have to interact with each other to reach a common goal and thus 
coordinate their actions, this means that one needs to have a representation not only of one‘s own 
actions, but also of the actions of one‘s interaction partner. While former theories of perception 
and action processing proposed separate coding systems for perception and action with little 
contact between the two, more recent theories suggest a common coding system of perceived and 
executed actions (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Sebanz, 
Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003, 2005; Prinz, 1997). This common coding approach suggests that action 
observation leads to automatic activation of motor representations in the observer, a mechanism 
called action co-representation. We observe an action of someone else, simulate the perceived 
movement, and are able to respond on it.  
  There is accumulating empirical support for a common coding system of perceived and 
executed actions. Research on verbal and non-verbal imitation demonstrates that people 
automatically and unconsciously do what others do: they mimic movements and postures 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; LaFrance, 1982), emotional expressions (Dimberg Thunberg, & 
Grunedal, 2002; Hatfield et al., 1992, 1994), and speech patterns of others (Cappela & Panalp, 
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1981; Webb, 1972). We smile when others smile and frown when others frown, we adjust our 
accent depending on whether people we talk to are coming from the south or the north of the 
country, and when we see someone shaking his foot we do so too. It is assumed that by 
perceiving what other people around us are doing, the tendency to perform the same movements 
is facilitated because observed and performed action share the same representational structures. 
Furthermore, cognitive studies on movement interference demonstrate that people are faster in 
performing a movement when they perceive someone else performing a congruent movement 
compared to an incongruent movement (e.g., Brass et al., 2001; Kilner Paulingnan, & Blakemore, 
2003; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000; for movement facilitation during observation of 
incongruent movements after a learning period see Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005). For 
example, it is easier for participants to perform a vertical respectively horizontal arm movement 
when observing another participant performing a congruent movement than when the observed 
arm movement is incongruent (Kilner et al., 2003). Again, it was theorised that congruent 
movements are easier because perception and execution share the same representation. In 
addition, neuroimaging studies showed that familiarity with certain movements elicit stronger 
motor activity in the observer than unfamiliar movements (e.g., Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007; 
Cross, Hamilton, Kraemer, Kelley, & Grafton, 2009).  
 Recently, the Social Simon task was introduced to investigate co-representation of action 
(Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai, Kuo, Jing, Hung, & Tzeng, 2006). In the 
classical Simon task participants have to respond to the colour of a stimulus (e.g., pressing a left 
key when a red stimulus appears or pressing a right key when a green stimulus appears on the left 
or right side of the screen) while ignoring the spatial location of the stimulus. The Simon effect 
refers to the finding that participants respond slower when the spatial relationship between 
stimulus and response is incongruent (e.g., pressing a left key in response to a stimulus on the 
right) than when it is congruent (e.g., pressing a left key in response to a stimulus on the left). 
The typical Simon effect disappears when participants only respond to one stimulus (e.g., to the 
green stimulus with a right response but not to the red stimulus) in a go/no-go version of the task. 
The reason is that a left response is only coded as left when it is encoded in context of a 
meaningful right response (Sebanz et al., 2003).  
 Interestingly, the Simon effect reappears when participants interact with somebody else 
who carries out the alternative response, thus when the participant responds to the green stimulus 
by pressing a right response button, and someone else responds to the red stimulus by pressing a 
left response button (Sebanz et al., 2003). In a social setting, participants seemingly co-represent 
the action of their interaction partner, which leads to a reappearance of the Simon effect. Thereby, 
the interaction partner does not necessarily need to be present to elicit a Simon effect; only the 
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imagination of performing a task with someone else is enough for a compatibility effect to occur 
(Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008; but see Welsh Higgins, Ray, & Weeks, 2007 for different 
findings). Nevertheless, an alternative response is fundamental for action co-representation to 
occur: if another participant is present but only observes the participant without performing any 
actions, no compatibility effect is found (Sebanz et al., 2003; Tsai & Brass, 2007). Further 
support for the necessity that the co-actor needs to give a response in order for action co-
representation to occur comes from EEG studies demonstrating that participants mentally 
perform the co-actors actions (Tsai et al., 2006).  
Is action co-representation biologically tuned? 
Because ‘the ability to coordinate our actions with those of others is crucial for our success as 
individuals and as a species’ (Sebanz et al., 2006, p. 70), it has been argued that humans have an 
evolutionary preference for biological actions, in the sense that co-representation of biological 
actions are functionally fundamentally different from representation of analogous, non-biological 
actions. Thus, it was suggested that action co-representation is influenced by bottom-up processes 
(e.g., Tsai et al., 2006; for a overview see Press, 2011). Various studies demonstrated that the 
shared-representation system is restricted to biological actions, and the system is not activated 
when the actions are performed by non-biological agents (e.g., a robot or a wooden hand; Kilner, 
Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004; Tsai & 
Brass, 2007; Tsai et al., 2008; Ramnani & Miall, 2004; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). As described 
above, Kilner and colleagues (2003) demonstrated that the execution of movements is facilitated 
respectively interfered with when people observe someone else performing a congruent versus an 
incongruent movement. However, if people observed a robot performing congruent or 
incongruent movements no facilitation or interference took place. In the same line, Brass and 
colleagues (2001) showed that participants were faster in performing certain finger movements 
when they perceived the same movements on a screen, while there was no decrease in response 
times (RT) when a spatial cue was presented as a cue for the movement. Using the Social Simon 
task, research further revealed that actions performed by a human interaction partner (indicated 
by a human hand on the screen) elicited a compatibility effect while actions performed by a non-
biological interaction partner (indicated by a wooden hand on the screen) did not lead to 
differences in RTs between compatible and incompatible trials (Tsai & Brass, 2007).  
 Although behavioural support for a common coding system that is biologically tuned is 
quite strong, neuroscientific evidence is mixed. On the one hand, a large body of research found 
stronger activation of the action observation network (AON) when comparing human actions 
with non-human actions (e.g., Costantini et al., 2005; Engel, Burke, Fiehler, Bien, & Rösier, 
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2008; Hogeveen & Obhi, 2012; Miura et al., 2010; Tai et al., 2004). While observing manual 
grasping actions performed by a human led to stronger activation in the left premotor cortex, this 
activation was not found when identical movements were made by a robot (Tai et al., 2004). 
Further support comes from studies comparing dance movements of humans versus dance 
movements performed by robots (e.g., Miura et al., 2010).  
 However, there are also studies demonstrating that non-biological actions can activate the 
AON as much as actions performed by biological agents (Cross et al., 2011; Gazzola, Rizzolatti, 
Wicker, & Keysers 2007; Gobbini et al., 2011; Oberman, McCleery, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 
2007; Saygin, Chaminade, Ishiguro, Driver, & Frith, 2012). For example, Gazzola, Rizzolatti, 
Wicker, and Keysers (2007) compared actions that clearly suggest a line of following actions 
(e.g., grasping a glass) and more simple actions that suggest no further stream of actions (e.g., 
moving a wooden block around), both performed by a human or a robot. No differences in 
BOLD-responses were found during observation of human actions compared to non-human 
actions, independent of whether they were complex and suggested a goal or not. In addition, it 
was demonstrated that human and robotic facial expression did both activate the same brain areas 
involved in face perception, and more importantly, robotic faces evoked stronger responses in the 
AON compared to human faces (Gobbini et al., 2011). One explanation for a lack of differences 
between human and non-human actions that was suggested was the familiarity of the participants 
with the stimulus materials: the more human-like the used non-human stimuli act, that is, human 
movement kinematics rather than more mechanically movement kinematics, the more similar the 
activation pattern in the brain (see also Kilner, Hamilton, & Blakemore, 2007).  
 However, there may be another explanation apart from familiarity: when action co-
representation is such an essential part for successful social interaction, it is possible that people 
co-represent actions differently depending on whether they perceived their interaction partner as 
an intentional agent or not. From an evolutionary point of view, co-representation of non-
intentional action is neither very functional nor necessary, whereas co-representation of 
intentional action - whether human or non-human - is. In the following section, evidence for a top 
down influence of social factors on action co-representation will be discussed.  
Possible top down modulation of joint action 
Based on the fact that action co-representation is a social phenomenon, it should be sensitive to 
manipulations of social variables and thus be influenced by higher order processes. Recent 
studies concentrated on whether top-down processes influence action co-representation (Hommel, 
Colzato, & van den Wildenberg, 2009; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Ruys & 
Aarts, 2010; Stanley, Gowen, & Miall, 2007). Indeed, action co-representation was only found 
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when participants performed the social Simon task together with another person (a confederate) 
who was perceived as friendly. However, when the confederate behaved in an unfriendly and 
pushy way, no compatibility effect was found. This suggests that actions were not co-represented 
(Hommel et al., 2009). Later research demonstrated that these findings cannot be explained by 
perceived friendliness per se, but by whether the participant and the ‘unfriendly‘ confederate had 
to compete with each other or not (Ruys & Aarts, 2010). When participants saw the confederate 
as a direct competitor and thus the actions of the confederate as important for the participants, 
action co-representation in form of a compatibility effect occurred. This was not the case when 
the confederate was seen as unfriendly but not competitive. Furthermore, studies conducted by 
Stanley and colleagues (2007) have shown that movement interference took place only when 
participants believed that a dot display was generated by another human, not when they thought is 
was generated by a computer. Only when participants thought they were presented with a human-
generated movement, interference took place, irrespective of whether the velocity was biological 
plausible or not. This was in line with further studies demonstrating that motor priming effects 
were influenced by participants‘ beliefs about whether a movement was performed by a human or 
not (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; for a theoretical framework see Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). 
Although these authors suggested that perceived animacy of the agent performing the observed 
action might have been responsible for these effects, unfortunately no additional variables like 
perceived intentionality were assessed. Nevertheless, these findings were first evidence that 
representations of our own actions and representations of actions of an interaction partner are not 
always socially shared, as had been suggested previously (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006), but can be 
separated under certain conditions and depend on the relationship between oneself and the 
interaction partner.   
Subsequently, I will examine literature demonstrating that humans very easily ascribe 
human attributes to objects, that this has a huge impact on how they behave towards these 
objects, and that this may therefore be one of the possible underlying processes for the 
differences found in action co-representation between biological action and non-biological action.  
Influence of social factors 
Anthropomorphism 
The tendency of humans to ascribe human-like characteristics, motivations, intentions, and/or 
emotions to non-human agents is called anthropomorphism (Epley et al., 2007). 
„Anthropomorphism involves going beyond behavioral descriptions of imagined or observable 
actions (e.g., the dog is affectionate) to represent an agent’s mental or physical characteristics 
using humanlike descriptors (e.g., the dog loves me)“ (Epley et al., 2007, page 865). Initially 
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introduced to describe the appearance of religious agents and gods (e.g., Hume, 1757, in Epley et 
al., 2007), the term is now used to describe animals or plants (Morewedge, Preston, & Wegner, 
2007), objects and technical devices (e.g., Burgoon et al., 2000), and even geometric shapes 
(Heider & Simmel, 1944). Thereby, it is suggested that when people anthropomorphise, they 
generalise their knowledge they have about other human beings or themselves to non-human 
agents, meaning that the same mental processes are involved in thinking about non-human agents 
and other humans. Neuroscientific research has indeed demonstrated that similar brain regions 
are activated when participants attribute mental states to non-human agents as when attributing 
mental states to other humans (e.g., Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Iacoboni et al., 2004). 
 In our daily lives, we are surrounded by non-human and non-living objects we have to use 
or to interact with. People automatically anthropomorphise (Epley et al., 2007; see also Mitchell, 
Thompson, & Miles, 1997), especially when the features of the object are human-like (e.g., 
Burgoon et al., 2000; Krach et al., 2008). Whether people anthropomorphise or not is assumed to 
depend on several factors such as elicited knowledge about the non-biological agent, the 
motivation to explain its behaviour, and a desire for social contact and affiliation (Epley et al., 
2007; Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008), and it has been shown that anthropomorphism 
can activate people‘s associated concepts and automatically influence later behaviour. For 
example, when participants were primed with of dogs, they behaved consistent with the 
associated concept of a dog and thus more loyal than participants who were primed with cats 
(Chartrand, Fitzsimons, & Fitzsimons, 2008). In addition, people rate robots acting playfully as 
being more extroverted and outgoing than seriously acting robots (Goetz, Kiesler, Powers, 2003; 
Kiesler, & Goetz, 2002), and avatars are judged to be more trustworthy, competent, sensitive, and 
warm when the avatar is anthropomorphised (Gong, 2008). Recent research demonstrated that 
gender stereotypes that typically bias social perceptions of humans could be generalised and even 
applied to robots. While female looking robots were perceived as more communicative, more 
male looking robots were perceived as being more agentic (Eyssel & Hegel, in press). In addition, 
it has been shown that anthropomorphic computer programs are seen as more useful and elicit 
stronger feelings of being understood (Burgoon et al., 2000). Thus, by anthropomorphising non-
human entities these become more similar to the one who makes these attributions.  
 Increased similarity may be an important function for ascribing humanness to objects: 
connection with somebody when direct contact with other humans is difficult. Indeed, it has been 
shown that people who are feeling lonely and who lack social connections compensate by 
anthropomorphising, thereby „creating humans out of non-human agents“ (Epley et al., 2008; 
page 146). As human beings are social animals, feeling similar to each other and being part of a 
group is an important factor for well being (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). An important, if not 
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one of the most essential social factors in human social interactions is group membership, people 
see themselves as members of social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Related to action co-
representation, research has revealed differences in motor cortex activation during observation of 
in-group vs. out-group members‘ actions (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010). Therefore, we assumed that 
group membership is, next to anthropomorphism, of special influence when it comes to action co-
representation. 
Group membership  
According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people derive a substantial part of 
their self-concept from membership in social groups. By doing so, we see other members of this 
group as more similar to us, while members of different groups are perceived as more different 
than they actually are (Tajfel, 1969). Additionally, the self-other overlap, that is, the overlap of 
mental representations of the self and mental representations of another person (Davis, Conklin, 
Smith, & Luce, 1996), increases when people belong to the same group and decreases when 
people belong to different groups (e.g., Aron et al., 2005). In line with this, it has been shown that 
out-group members are evaluated more negatively than in-group members (Brewer, 1979). The 
activated social category guides further information processing about an out-group member 
(Brewer, 1988), thereby keeping out-group members to be perceived as more negative then they 
are. Neuroscientific research demonstrated a modulation of error-related brain activity during 
observation of actions performed by in-group vs. out-group members in a competitive context 
(Newman-Norlund, Ganesh, van Schie, de Bruijn, & Bekkering, 2009). Pain-related brain activity 
decreased when observing an out-group member in pain than when observing a familiar and 
unfamiliar in-group member in pain (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010), suggesting that group-
membership, and not physical similarity or familiarity is primarily involved in influencing in-
group biases. Furthermore, research has found a decrease in mu-suppression for the observation 
of out-group members’ action (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010), a first indication that actions performed 
by out-group members are not co-represented. These effects were more pronounced in 
participants high in prejudice and the authors suggested that these differences might be 
responsible to foster prejudice and stereotyping.  
 Related to anthropomorphism, studies have shown that we not only ascribe human 
attributes towards objects and non-human entities, but that this process can also go the other way 
around: we dehumanise out-group members, deny that they have intentions, motivations and 
emotions, and make them more object-like (for a review see Haslam, 2006). It is possible that 
categorising another person as an out-group member might function as a reduced indication that 
this person is a co-actor, thereby preventing to co-represent his or her actions. This would be in 
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line with research showing that actions of negatively evaluated or competing people are not co-
represented (Hommel et al., 2009; Ruys & Aarts, 2010). Thus, this may be a reason for less 
successful interactions with out-group members compared to in-group members. Therefore, it is 
important to explore how these differences in action co-representation can be diminished with the 
goal to improve interactions with out-group members. Research on group membership has shown 
that perspective-taking seems a promising tool to overcome the negative consequences of 
negative attitudes about the out-group. 
Perspective-taking 
Research on stereotypes demonstrated that both accessibility and the expression of stereotypes for 
out-group members decrease after perspective-taking (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and the 
positive consequences of taking the perspective of an out-group member can be generalised to the 
whole out-group. After having taken the perspective of an out-group member, attitudes towards 
the out-group become more positive, and these changes in attitude can facilitate actual helping 
behaviour towards any member of the out-group (Batson et al., 1997; Batson, Chang, Orr, & 
Rowland, 2002). For example, people are more likely to ascribe self-descriptive traits onto a 
target person after taking that person’s perspective (Davis et al., 1996). Moreover, perspective 
takers better understand the actions of others (Lozano, Hard, & Tversky, 2006). Galinsky, Ku, 
and Wang (2005) suggested that these positive consequences of perspective-taking result from 
increased self-other overlap in cognitive representations (see also Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 
1996).  
But does an increased overlap in cognitive representations also lead to stronger 
representations of others actions? Are differences in action co-representation between in-group 
and out-group members’ flexible, and can they be changed by instructing participants to take the 
perspective of an out-group member before interacting with another member of the same out-
group? If so, taking the perspective of an out-group member should not only decrease stereotype 
accessibility and improve attitudes towards the out-group, but also improve coordination of 
actions on a very basic level, thereby improving social interactions. 
The present dissertation 
In the present dissertation we examined the social moderators that possibly influence action co-
representation. The experiment described in chapter 2.1 (Müller, Brass et al., 2011) investigated 
whether action co-representation for non-biological actions is possible and may depend on the 
perceived animacy of the non-biological interaction partner. Research assumed that this co-
representation system is activated by biological agents only (e.g., Kilner, Paulignan, & 
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Blakemore, 2003; Tsai & Brass, 2007). However, in daily life, we often identify with biological 
agents whereas this is less likely for non-biological agents. Nevertheless, it is known that people 
ascribe human attributes to objects. Therefore, our study investigated whether action co-
representation depends on the perceived animacy of the non-biological interaction partner. We 
explored this issue by using the social Simon task (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003). Before performing a 
social Simon task with either an animated image of a human or a wooden hand, participants 
either watched a video fragment of a biological agent, or of a non-biological agent, Pinocchio, to 
increase perceived animacy of this agent. Whereas participants who watched the ‘biological’ 
agent showed a Simon effect only when co-acting with a biological agent, participants who 
watched a ‘non-biological’ agent (i.e., Pinocchio) showed a Simon effect only when co-acting 
with a non-biological agent. Furthermore, these participants did not co-represent actions of a 
biological agent when they formed a vivid impression of Pinocchio, thus seemingly co-
representation of biological agents can be suppressed. These findings provide additional evidence 
for the assumption that motor simulation strongly depends on higher order processes. The 
interaction partner does not necessarily need to be a real person. Instead, co-representation of 
action may also occur when interacting with characters of a video game, which implies that the 
common distinction in the literature between biological action and non-biological action is 
inadequate to explain the phenomenon of action co-representation. 
 In chapter 3.1 (Müller, van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, submitted), we investigated in two 
studies whether perceiving a non-biological agent behaving in a human-like manner also 
influences meaningful pro-social behaviour. As research has mainly focused on explicitly 
measured attitudes towards objects (e.g., Waytz et al., 2010), the effects of anthropomorphism on 
actual social behaviour are not yet understood. To clarify this effect, participants either watched a 
video fragment with a biological agent or a non-biological agent (i.e., Pinocchio) as the main 
character, in order to increase perceived agency of the respective agent. Subsequently, 
participants‘ behaviour towards the biological and non-biological agent was assessed by 
measuring interpersonal closeness, and pro-social behaviour (i.e., assigning money to both of 
them). In study I (chapter 3.1.), participants who watched the ‘non-biological’ agent acted more 
pro-social towards the non-biological agent compared to participants who watched the 
‘biological’ agent, meaning that they picked a chair closer to Pinocchio when offered this 
possibility. These results were replicated in study II (chapter 3.2.). Additionally, participants in 
this study assigned more money tickets to Pinocchio than to a real person. These results show that 
when we anthropomorphise non-biological agents, this has profound effects on how we interact 
with these agents: it leads to more interpersonal closeness, and more pro-social behaviour 
towards this agent. As interactions with interactive advices and robots will become more and 
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more frequent in the future, the present findings could be used to optimise these interactions, and 
improve the usefulness of these agents.  
 After demonstrating in chapter 2 that co-representation of non-biological actions is 
possible when the non-biological agent is relatively similar to a human being, Chapter 4.1. 
(Müller, Oostendorp et al., in prep) deals with the question whether the non-biological interaction 
partner needs to posses human features for action simulation to occur. Again, we used the social 
Simon task to measure action co-representation. In the first study (chapter 4.1.), we demonstrate 
that participants who perform a social Simon task with an animated human hand and an animated 
object (i.e., a ball) only co-represent actions of the biological interaction partner. In Study II 
(chapter 4.2.), participants were presented with either a picture of the object they had to interact 
with, or with two types of short video fragments: one in which the object moved in an 
unintentional but predictable way (i.e., from left to right on the screen), in the other video 
fragment movements of the object suggested that the object had a Theory of Mind (ToM). It was 
found that participants co-represent actions of an object when they watched a short video 
fragment with the same object moving around before performing the same social Simon task, 
independent of whether the movements could be interpreted as unintentional or ToM. When they 
were presented with a picture of the same object beforehand no action co-representation occurred. 
Our third study (chapter 4.3.) tried to disentangle whether perceived intentionality and 
perspective-taking have an influence on action co-representation of non-biological actions to 
occur. Participants saw a video fragment of an object moving in a random way. These 
movements were described as either intentional or unintentional. Furthermore, participants either 
received the instruction to take the perspective of the object or not. We demonstrate that only 
perspective-taking has an influence on action co-representation of non-biological actions, and that 
this is the case even if no human features are present. When participants took the perspective of 
the object a Simon effect was found, compared to when they did not take the perspective of the 
object. No effects were found for ascribed intentionality. These findings further support our 
suggestion that action co-representation for higher order processes such as perspective-taking 
influence non-biological actions. 
 In chapter 5.1. (Müller, Kühn et al., 2011), we leave more abstract interactions between 
humans and objects to human - human interactions and we look at moderating effects of social 
factors that may influence shared representations. We investigated whether actions performed by 
in-group and out-group members are represented differently, and if so, whether perspective-
taking can overcome these differences. One important social factor in human social interactions is 
group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). People derive a substantial part of their self-concept 
from membership of social groups and respond more negatively towards out-group members than 
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towards in-group members. However, recent research suggests that perspective-taking supports a 
better understanding of others actions (Lozano, Hard, & Tversky, 2006) and it stimulates people  
to evaluate out-group members more positively. These positive consequences of perspective-
taking results from increased self-other overlap in cognitive representations (Galinsky, Ku, & 
Wang 2005, see also Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). In our experiments, white 
participants performed a social Simon task with an animated image of a hand with either white or 
black skin tone. The results of chapter 5.1. demonstrated that actions performed by in-group 
members were co-represented while actions of out-group members were not. In chapter 5.2., it 
was found that participants co-represented actions of out-group members when they read about 
an out-group member and had to take his perspective prior to the actual experiment, thus they 
were instructed to imagine being the person of the story they read. Thus, actions of out-group 
members are indeed co-represented substantially less than actions performed by in-group 
members. Depending on social factors like group-membership, the overlap between 
representations of one’s own actions and representation of actions of others are reduced. 
However, these differences in action co-representation are not stable but flexible, and can be 
eliminated by increasing perspective-taking between members from different social groups. 
Conclusions 
The present dissertation investigated the influence of social moderators on action co-
representation. In the following section the implications of the main concepts investigated, that is 
anthropomorphism, group membership, and perspective-taking will be discussed separately.  
Anthropomorphism 
Recent literature suggested that human action representation is biologically tuned (e.g., Tsai et 
al., 2004; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai et al., 2008). An evolutionary default in the motor system has 
been proposed which differentiates fundamentally between representations of actions performed 
by biological agents and representations of actions performed by non-biological agents. In light 
of the present results, a more precise explanation seems plausible: we obtained evidence for the 
influence of higher order processes in co-representing actions of others and this evidence reveals 
that the human co-representation system is not just biologically tuned. The interaction partner did 
not necessarily need to be a real person, which implies that the common distinction in the 
literature between biological action and non-biological action is inadequate to explain the 
phenomenon of action co-representation. By observing a non-biological agent behaving in a 
human-like way, this agent may be perceived as being more human-like, which in turn leaded to 
co-representations of its actions (chapter 2.1.).  
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 Interestingly, in the same chapter we could show that exposure to a non-biological agent 
did not broaden the category of agentive biological motion but rather shifted it away from the 
normal, human aligned exemplar. The occurrence of co-representation of biological actions 
depended on whether participants could form a vivid image of the non-biological agent: the more 
vivid the non-biological agent, the more human-like this agent was perceived, and the less 
pronounced the compatibility effect was during interaction with another human. Thus, perceiving 
a non-biological agent behaving in an intentional way increased co-representation of its actions. 
In addition, when people had a vivid image, and formed a strong impression of the non-biological 
agent, they may see themselves as less similar to the biological agent, and co-representations of 
biological actions were suppressed in some way. That is, it seems that only actions of similar co-
actors were simulated. Recent literature has shown that the social Simon effect disappeared after 
manipulating the valence of the relationship between actor and co-actor (Hommel, Colzato, & 
van den Wildenberg, 2009) and when the interaction partner was an out-group member 
(Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Müller et al., 2011b). Literature on social category activation 
may provide another possible explanation for the present findings. People categorise others on the 
basis of social categories (e.g., gender, race, age) to simplify social information and save 
cognitive resources (Allport, 1954). If multiple categories can be applied to the same person, the 
most dominant one is activated, while the others are suppressed (e.g., Macrae & Bodenhausen, 
2000). It might be the case that a very vivid representation of Pinocchio may temporarily 
suppress representations of biological agents. On the basis of the present results, we cannot say 
which of the two processes is at work here. Therefore, this question needs further investigation. 
Incorporating these findings, we could demonstrate in chapter 4.1. that the non-biological agent 
did not need to posses any human features for action co-representation to occur. Thereby, the 
influence of vividness of the object had again an important influence on the occurrence of action 
co-representation. 
Results of chapter 3.1. show that anthropomorphism of objects has an influence on 
meaningful social behaviour. These results indicate that when we anthropomorphise non-
biological agents, we start to behave more pro-socially towards these non-biological agents. 
Especially the fact that watching a movie of Pinocchio led participants to give more lottery 
tickets to Pinocchio (and fewer to a real person) is striking. After all, on a conscious, rational 
level, all participants are most likely aware that a lottery ticket is not at all useful for Pinocchio. 
However, when we become immersed in a story with a non-biological agent, anthropomorphism 
can easily override such “cold” rational considerations. As interactions with non-biological 
agents steadily gain importance in our society and seem to become more and more important in 
the future, our findings may help to further improve interactions with these agents. Ascribing 
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human attributes to these agents may help to increase the fluency of interactions between humans 
and non-humans. 
 These findings should be seen in relation to another important phenomenon when it comes 
to human - non-human interactions: the uncanny valley (Mori, 1970). The more human-like an 
agent‘s appearance, the more positive people‘s attitude becomes. However, at one point the 
striking similarity with a human may lead to feelings of disconnection and awkwardness (e.g., 
Seyama, & Nagayama, 2007; Steckenfinger, & Ghazanfar, 2009). It is suggested that a 
congruency of appearance of the robot and movement kinematics is of special importance (e.g., 
Saygin, Chaminade, Ishiguro, Driver, & Frith, 2011). When both kinematics and appearance were 
clearly non-human activation in the Action-Observation Network (AON) was found, compared to 
situations in which appearance were human while kinematics were robotic. However, while 
research by Saygin and colleagues investigated the mismatch between human appearance and 
non-human movement kinematics, our studies focused on the mismatch between non-human 
appearance and human movement kinematics, thus different mechanisms may be at work here. In 
addition, in the present dissertation we only used non-human agents that were either clearly not 
human like (i.e., a ball or a triangle, chapter 4.1. to 4.3.), or agents that had human features but 
were still clearly not too human-like (i.e., Pinocchio, chapter 2.1. and chapter 3.1.). The 
question remains whether the present findings can be replicated with humanoid robots used to 
investigate the uncanny valley phenomenon. In the following paragraph, we explain how 
perspective-taking could have the same positive consequences when robots are very close to 
humans in appearance and behaviour and helps to overcome the negative feelings 
characteristically for the uncanny valley phenomenon. Anyhow, further research is crucial to 
resolve this question.  
Group membership & perspective-taking 
In chapter 5.1., we show that categorising another person as an in-group member instead of an 
out-group member might function as an enhanced indication that this person is a co-actor, thereby 
triggering the tendency to co-represent his or her actions. It was argued that because of these 
differences in action co-representation “empathy may be restricted to close others and, without 
active effort, may not extend to out-groups, making them likely targets of prejudice and 
discrimination“ (Gutsell & Inzlicht, page S52). These findings are additionally underpinned by 
research revealing that co-representation of pain, as well as emotion recognition is also restricted 
to in-group members (Avenanti et al., 2010; Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2002; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & 
Han, 2009). The present findings are, to the best of our knowledge, the first showing that 
perspective-taking may offer a solution: taking the perspective of an out-group member not only 
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decreases stereotype accessibility, and improves attitudes towards the out-group, but also 
improves coordination of actions on a very basic level, thereby improving social interactions. In 
addition, we could demonstrate that perspective-taking and the possibly resulting self-other 
overlap increased action co-representation for objects, and seemed to be the main factor behind 
the occurrence of action co-representation (chapter 4.3.). 
 However, it is necessary to disentangle the underlying mechanisms of the present 
findings. Perspective-taking increases positivity towards an out-group, as well as similarity and 
self-other overlap with an out-group interaction partner (Batson et al., 1997). This raises the 
question of whether increased self-other overlap, increased similarity, or increased positivity is 
responsible for our findings. Based on the literature, all three explanations are possible: It has 
been argued that action co-representation partly depends on the perceived overlap of one’s 
representation of the self and the representation of the interaction partner, and of the group-
membership of the interaction partner (Müller et al., 2011b). In addition, recent research 
demonstrates that the valence of the interaction influences action co-representation (Hommel et 
al., 2009). However, a positive relationship with an interaction partner increases self-other 
overlap (Aron et al., 1991), and it seems difficult to disentangle positivity, similarity, and self-
other overlap as the possible underlying mechanism.   
 In most of the studies in the present dissertation, the social Simon task was used to 
measure action co-representation. Our interpretation of these findings seemingly contradict a 
growing body of research exploring whether the social Simon effect is based on the spatial 
salience introduced by a co-actor rather than a measurement for action co-representation 
(Dittrich, Rothe, & Klauer, 2012; Dolk et al., 2011; Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, submitted; 
Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010). These studies demonstrated that a compatibility effect also 
occurs when a random moving or sound-making object (i.e., a Japanese Lucky Cat, a clock, or a 
metronome) is placed on the left side of the participant, thereby increasing the salience of the left 
stimulus location (Dolk et al., submitted). Additionally, it was shown that the social Simon effect 
is found only if the interaction partner was sitting within arm reach of the participants (Guagnano 
et al., 2010), or if the horizontal spatial response dimension was made less salient by introducing 
a vertical response dimension (Dittrich et al., 2012). Dittrich and colleagues (2012) have 
suggested that „social factors might modulate spatial response coding instead of shared task 
representations; that is, social factors might enhance the spatial interpretation of a situation“ 
(page 912). However, we think that until now these studies could not fully eliminate the social 
component in their designs. Results of Guagnano and colleagues (2010) could be explained by a 
decrease in self-other overlap with an increase in distance between actor and co-actor, which 
would be in line with our argumentation that an increase in self-other overlap fosters action co-
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representation (see chapter 5.1.). In addition, an increase in anthropomorphism as shown in 
chapter 4.1. and chapter 4.2. could be responsible for findings by Dolk and colleagues. It might 
be possible that participants in their studies perceived the objects on the left side of them as 
intentionally acting agents, or ascribe other human intentions and mental states to the objects. At 
least in some of the studies which are part of this dissertation, it was explicitly asked whether 
participants attended more to one of the two different types of interaction partner (chapter 4.1.) 
or whether attention rating differ between conditions (chapter 4.2.) and no significant differences 
have been found. Furthermore, a host of studies demonstrated that group-membership 
categorisation and stereotypes can be automatically activated (e.g., Blair, 2002; Dotsch & 
Wigboldus, 2008; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), which makes it seem 
unlikely that the left response is less salient when interacting for example with an out-group 
member. Another explanation might be that two separate mechanisms are at work here: both 
spatial salience as well as perspective-taking could influence the compatibility effects of the 
social Simon task. Thus, when two participants are performing the social Simon task, a 
compatibility effect occurs because actions of the co-actor are co-represented, depending on the 
self-other overlap between the two interaction partners. However, a compatibility effect can also 
occur when the left response is salient, which does not per se need to be a sign of the fact that 
actions are co-represented. To answer this question, further research should focus on the 
underlying mechanisms of the social Simon effect. 
 Taken together, the experiments in the present dissertation are among the first to shed 
more light on the influences social factors might have on co-representation of action. Moreover, 
our results provide means to improve representations we have of actions of our interactions 
partner, which could enhance our social interactions on a very basic level. 
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Chapter 
 
 
When Pinocchio acts like a human, a wooden hand becomes 
embodied. Action co-representation for non-biological agents. 
 
Action observation automatically activates corresponding motor 
representations in the observer, which is essential in coordinating actions with 
others. It is assumed that this co-representation system is activated by 
biological agents only. However, we often identify with biological agents, 
whereas this is not the case for non-biological agents. The present study 
investigated whether action co-representation depends on the perceived 
animacy of the non-biological interaction partner. Before performing a social 
Simon task with either an animated image of a human or a wooden hand, 
participants either watched a video fragment of a biological agent, or of a non-
biological agent, Pinocchio, to increase perceived animacy of this agent. 
Whereas participants who watched the ‘biological’ agent showed a Simon 
effect only when co-acting with a biological agent, participants who watched 
‘non-biological’ agent (i.e. Pinocchio) showed a Simon effect only when co-
acting with a non-biological agent. The present findings provide evidence for 
the assumption that motor simulation strongly depends on higher order 
processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: Müller, B. C. N., Brass, M., Kühn, S., Tsai, C.-C., Nieuwboer, W., Dijksterhuis, A., & van 
Baaren, R. B. (2011). When Pinocchio acts like a human, a wooden hand becomes embodied. Action co-
representation for non-biological agents. Neuropsychologia, 49, 1373-1377.
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We often coordinate our actions with the actions of people around us. Whether we carry a heavy 
object together, cook with friends, or play soccer: joint action is essential for successful social 
interaction (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). The literature suggests a common coding 
system of perceived and executed actions: action observation leads to automatic activation of 
motor representations in the observer (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 
2001; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003, 2005; Prinz, 1997). This motor simulation mechanism, 
called co-representation of action, seems to be restricted to the observation of biological agents 
(Ramnani & Miall, 2004; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008).  In the present 
study, we explored whether these findings could be explained by higher order processes. 
The social Simon task is a useful tool to investigate co-representation of action (Sebanz et 
al., 2003; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai, Kuo, Jing, Hung, & Tzeng, 2006). In the classical Simon task 
participants have to respond to the colour of a stimulus (e.g., pressing a left key when a red 
stimulus appears or pressing a right key when a green stimulus appears on the screen) while 
ignoring the spatial location of the stimulus. The Simon effect refers to the finding that 
participants respond slower when the spatial relationship between stimulus and response is 
incompatible (e.g., pressing a left key in response to a stimulus on the right) than when it is 
compatible (e.g., pressing a left key in response to a stimulus on the left). The typical Simon 
effect disappears when participants only respond to one stimulus (e.g., to the green stimulus with 
a right response but not to the red stimulus) in a go/no-go version of the task. The reason is that a 
left response is only coded as left when it is encoded in context of a meaningful right response 
(Sebanz et al., 2003). The Simon effect reappears when participants interact with somebody else 
who carries out the alternative response (Sebanz et al., 2003). In a social setting, participants 
seemingly co-represent the action of their interaction partner leading to a reappearance of the 
Simon effect.  
Various studies demonstrated that the shared-representation system is restricted to 
biological actions, and the system is not activated when the actions are performed by non-
biological agents (e.g., a robot; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, 
Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai et al., 2008; Ramnani & Miall, 2004; 
Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). It has been argued that humans have an evolutionary preference for 
biological action, in the sense that co-representation of biological actions are functionally 
fundamentally different from representation of analogous, non-biological actions (Tsai et al., 
2006). However, instead of the proposed biologically tuned system the observed effects may be 
explained by higher order processes that could influence co-representation of action. As ‘the 
ability to coordinate our actions with those of others is crucial for our success as individuals and 
as a species’ (Sebanz et al., 2006, p. 70), it is possible that people co-represent actions differently 
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depending on whether they interpret these actions as performed by a ,real‘ person. Recent 
research has demonstrated that the motor priming effect depends on whether participants believed 
that a moving hand wearing a leather glove belongs to an intentional agent (Liepelt & Brass, 
2010; see also Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010).  
Narratives increase identification of television characters and avatars in video games, 
which in turn is assumed to influence later behaviour (e.g., Schneider, Lang, Shin, & Bradley, 
2004). Additionally, narratives can strongly influence perception of the world by transportation or 
absorption into a story, changing people’s beliefs about what is real (Appel & Richter, 2007; 
Green & Brock, 2000; Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004). Furthermore, people tend to 
automatically ascribe human attributes and agency to objects (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), 
especially when the features of the object are human-like (Burgoon et al., 2000). Therefore, in the 
present study we had participants form a vivid image of their interaction partner by watching a 
short video fragment with as main character either a human or an animated character, Pinocchio. 
Participants were asked to take the perspective of the main character (see also Müller et al., 
2011a). After watching the video, participants performed a go/no-go Simon task, co-acting with 
either a human or a wooden hand. If action co-representation is solely biologically tuned, the 
social Simon effect should only be expected for participants interacting with the human hand, 
independent of the video presented before the task (Tsai & Brass, 2007). However, we expected 
that co-representation of actions performed by non-biological agents might be possible when the 
agent is perceived as acting in a human-like manner. Based on the later notion, the social Simon 
effect should also be observed when participants first see Pinocchio behaving like a biological 
agent, and afterwards interact with a wooden agent.  
2.1. Methods 
2.1.1. Participants 
Seventy-two female students from the Radboud University Nijmegen (age 17 – 30 years) 
received credit points or financial compensation for their participation. All participants were 
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants saw a 5-minute video fragment of Walt Disney’s ‘Pinocchio’ (non-biological 
condition, n = 34) or a Dutch version of the comedy ‘Love actually’ (biological condition, n = 
38), whereby they were instructed to take the perspective of the main character. By doing so, we 
expected to increase identification with the main character Pinocchio. Participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions. Evaluation of both film fragments did not differ between conditions 
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(‘How amusing did you think the film was?’, F < 1, n.s.). After watching the fragment, 
participants had to indicate how well they could form an impression of the main character they 
had to focus on, answering one question of the transportation scale (‘While seeing the movie, I 
could form a vivid1 image of Pinocchio’; Green & Brock, 2000), using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
do not agree, 7 = agree). Subsequently, all participants performed an identical Simon task with an 
animated human hand and an animated wooden hand. They put their right hand on a 17 in. LCD 
screen where a single response key was placed. At the centre of the screen, the standard Simon 
stimulus – a rectangle surrounding three horizontally arranged circles – was presented. On each 
trial, one of the circles was either coloured green or red.     
 In all conditions, an image of either a human or wooden hand was displayed on the left 
side of the screen. The hands differed neither in shape, size, nor colour (Fig. 1). Participants had 
to respond whenever a green dot appeared on the screen. The hand displayed on the left side 
‘responded’ to red targets, pressing a button on participants’ no-go trials. A five-frame image 
sequence (38 ms per frame) was presented, which showed the hand in different postures, with the 
index finger approaching the response button. The first image of this sequence was used as 
fixation display (Figure 1) 
Figure 1. Sample Frames of the Human Hand (a) and Wooden Hand (b).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As the study was conducted in Dutch, the closest translation we could come up with is 
vivid/vividness. Literately, we asked participants whether they perceived Pinocchio as somebody 
who is alive (derived from the Dutch word „levendig“, from the Latin word vividus). 
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 No-go trials (Fig. 2a) were preceded by a 500 ms fixation display. Then, a red target was 
presented for 150 ms. After a variable interval (300 – 450 ms), the image sequence started. 
Finally, the fixation display was presented (1000 ms). Go trials (Fig. 2b) also started with a 500 
ms fixation display. Next, a green target was presented for 150 ms. RTs were recorded from the 
onset of the target. Participants were instructed to respond to the green targets as quickly as 
possible, without making too many errors (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Illustration of the Stimulus Sequence on (a) No-go Trials and (b) Go Trials. 
 There were 45 go trials and 45 no-go trials for the human hand condition and the wooden 
hand condition (20 go/compatible trials; 20 go/incompatible trials; 5 go trials where the target 
was presented in the middle). The order of the conditions was counterbalanced across subjects. 
To prevent carry-over effects, we introduced a 2-minutes break between conditions. 
Subsequently, participants were debriefed, and paid.  
2.2. Results 
All trials with RTs below 150 ms or above 1500 ms (0.1%) were excluded2. As action perception 
is an essential component for action co-representation (Tsai & Brass, 2007), five people who 
reported that the hand on the screen did not move were excluded.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Because RTs were not normally distributed, we performed a log-transformation.  
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A 2 (Video: Pinocchio vs. biological) x 2 (Interaction partner: human hand vs. wooden 
hand) repeated measures analysis on the difference scores revealed no main effects for Video nor 
Interaction partner, F‘s < 1. However, a significant interaction between Video and Interaction 
partner was found, F(1,65) = 4.06, p < .05, η²ρ = .06. The Compatibility effect for the human 
hand was stronger in the biological condition than in the Pinocchio condition (biological: 11 ms; 
Pinocchio: 5 ms), but this pattern was reversed when participants interacted with a wooden hand 
(biological: 4 ms; Pinocchio: 14 ms). Post-hoc analyses revealed a significant effect of 
Compatibility for the wooden hand only in the Pinocchio condition, t(31) = 2.73, p < .05, but not 
in the biological condition, t(34) = 1.03, p > .30. Interestingly, the Compatibility effect for the 
human hand was restricted to the biological condition, t(34) = 2.44, p < .05, and did not occur in 
the Pinocchio condition, t(31) = 1.03, p > .30. Figure 3 shows the RT data3 (Figure 3). 
 Difference scores for the compatibility effect in the human hand compared to the 
compatibility effect in the wooden hand were calculated by subtracting RTs of the wooden hand 
(compatible - incompatible) from RTs of the human hand, with higher scores representing a 
stronger compatibility effect in the human hand. To investigate the absence of the compatibility 
effect for the human hand in the Pinocchio condition in more detail, correlations were calculated 
between the vividness of the impression participants formed of Pinocchio, and the difference 
scores between the compatibility effect of the human hand and the compatibility effect of the 
wooden hand.  
 Interestingly, the better participants could form an impression of Pinocchio, the smaller was 
the compatibility effect during interaction with a human hand compared to interaction with a 
wooden hand, r = -.32, p < .05 (1-tailed). Thus, participants with “poor” impressions of Pinocchio 
showed a stronger compatibility effect in the human hand condition, while participants with a 
more vivid impressions showed a stronger compatibility effect in the wooden hand condition. 
Additionally, we performed a median split and included Impression (poor vs. vivid) as factor in 
the analysis. Participants with poor impressions of Pinocchio only showed a marginal significant 
compatibility effect, F(1,17) = 3.60, p = .07, η²ρ = .17, for both the human hand (10 ms) and the 
wooden hand (7 ms), while the interaction of compatibility and interaction partner was non-
significant, F(1,17) < 1. However, participants with vivid impressions of Pinocchio showed a 
significant interaction between compatibility and interaction partner, F(1,13) = 4.74, p < .05, η²ρ 
= .27, with a significant compatibility effect only when interacting with a wooden hand (t(13) = 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In a second study, we replicated these findings using the same design. Participants who watched 
Pinocchio only co-represented actions of a wooden hand but not actions of a human hand, while 
the reversed pattern was found for participants who watched the biological movie, F(1,37) = 
4.32, p < .05, η²ρ = .10. 
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2.79, p < .01, 12 ms), but not when interacting with a human hand (t(13) < 1, n.s.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean Reaction Times in the Biological (a) and Pinocchio (b) Conditions of the Social 
Simon Task as a Function of Interaction Partner (Human vs. Wooden) and Compatibility 
(Compatible vs. Incompatible Trials). Error Bars Represent the Standard Error. 
2.3. Discussion 
In the present study, we demonstrated that co-representation of non-biological actions can occur 
if participants form a vivid image of the non-biological agent. Whereas participants who first 
watched a video with human actors showed a compatibility effect only when interacting with a 
human hand, participants who watched a video of Pinocchio showed a compatibility effect only 
during interaction with a wooden hand. This effect was stronger for participants who formed a 
vivid impression of Pinocchio, while participants with a poor impression of Pinocchio showed a 
compatibility effect for the human and to the wooden hand. Thus, we obtained evidence for the 
influence of higher order processes in co-representing actions of others.  
Recent literature suggests that human action representation is biologically tuned (Tsai et 
al., 2004; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai et al., 2008). An evolutionary default in the motor system has 
been suggested, with a fundamental difference between representations of actions performed by 
biological agents and representations of actions performed by non-biological agents. In light of 
our results, a more precise explanation seems plausible: as human beings are sensitive to human 
movements (e.g., Epley et al., 2007), a Simon effect occurs when participants interact with a 
human hand after watching a video with a biological main character. However, co-representation 
of action performed by a non-biological agent also occurred after watching a video of Pinocchio. 
By observing a non-biological agent behaving in a human-like way, the wooden hand may be 
perceived as belonging to an intentional agent, which in turn leads to a Simon effect (Liepelt & 
Brass, 2010; Teufel et al., 2010). Interesting questions for further research are whether the present 
findings can be replicated with less human-like non-biological agents (e.g., a robot or an avatar), 
b) a) 
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and to which extent non-biological agents need to possess human features to perceive them as 
vivid. In addition to the biological versus non-biological debate, it would be interesting to study 
action simulation of conspecifics versus non-conspecifics (Bucchino et al., 2004) to explore to 
what extend the present results are generalisable. Furthermore, in follow up research it would be 
advisable to control for possible salience effects of non-biological movements, for example by 
presenting a movie of an interaction between a human and a non-biological agent.  
The compatibility effect in the human hand condition disappeared after watching 
Pinocchio. This is surprising, as it could be assumed that exposure to a non-biological agent 
would broaden the category of agentive biological motion rather than shift it away from the 
normal, human aligned exemplar. However, this absence of a compatibility effect depended on 
whether participants could form a vivid image of Pinocchio: the worse the image of Pinocchio, 
the more pronounced the compatibility effect in the human hand condition was compared to the 
wooden hand condition. Literature on social category activation may provide a possible 
explanation for the present finding. Different studies demonstrated that people categorise others 
on the basis of social categories (e.g., gender, race, age) to simplify social information and save 
cognitive resources (Allport, 1954). If multiple categories can be applied to the same person, the 
most dominant one is activated, while the others are suppressed (e.g., Macrae & Bodenhausen, 
2000). The absence of a compatibility effect in the human hand for participants with a stronger 
impression may be explained by a similar process: a very active representation of Pinocchio may 
temporarily suppress representations of biological agents.  
A second explanation might be that only actions of similar others are co-represented. 
Recent literature has shown that the social Simon effect disappears after manipulating the valence 
of the relationship between actor and co-actor (Hommel, Colzato, & van den Wildenberg, 2009) 
and when the interaction partner is an out-group member (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; 
Müller et al., 2011b). Thus when interaction partners are less similar, no action co-representation 
occurs. Possibly, two different processes are at work simultaneously: perceiving a non-biological 
agent behaving in an intentional way increases co-representation of its actions. But additionally, 
when people have a vivid image, and form a strong impression of the non-biological agent, they 
may see themselves as less similar to the biological agent, and co-representations of biological 
actions are suppressed in some way. Thus only actions of similar co-actors are simulated. On the 
basis of the present results, we cannot say which of the two processes is at work here, and this 
question needs further investigation.  
In sum, our results clearly show that the human co-representation system is not just 
biologically tuned. The interaction partner does not necessarily need to be a `real` person. 
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Instead, co-representation of action may also occur when interacting with characters of a video 
game, which implies that the common distinction in the literature between biological action and 
non-biological action is inadequate to explain the phenomenon of action co-representation. 
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Chapter 
 
 
A present for Pinocchio:  
On when non-biological agents become real 
 
People often ascribe human attributes to objects, a phenomenon named 
anthropomorphism. As research has mainly focused on explicitly measured 
attitudes towards objects, the effects of anthropomorphism on actual social 
behaviour are not yet understood. In the present studies, we investigated 
whether perceiving a non-biological agent who behaved in a human-like 
manner influences pro-social behaviour. Participants either watched a video 
fragment with a biological agent or a non-biological agent (i.e., Pinocchio) as 
main character, in order to increase perceived agency of the respective agent. 
Subsequently, their pro-social behaviour towards the biological and non-
biological agent was assessed by measuring interpersonal closeness, and pro-
social behaviour. Participants who watched the ‘non-biological’ agent acted 
more pro-social towards the non-biological agent compared to participants 
who watched the ‘biological’ agent, meaning that they sat closer to Pinocchio, 
and assigned more lottery tickets to him. These results show that when we 
anthropomorphise non-biological agents, this has profound effects on how we 
interact with these agents: it leads to more interpersonal closeness, and more 
pro-social behaviour towards this agent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: Barbara C. N. Müller, Rick B. van Baaren, Ap Dijksterhuis (submitted). A present for 
Pinocchio: On when non-biological agents become real.
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In our daily lives, we are surrounded by non-living objects that are supposed to help us: whether 
we use our computers, mobile phones, our car, the coffee maker, or the navigation system, we 
continuously interact with non-living objects and this array of technology and virtual agents 
expands constantly. Therefore, it will become more and more important to explore how our 
interactions with these objects can be optimised.  
 People spontaneously ascribe human attributes and agency to objects (Epley, Waytz, & 
Cacioppo, 2007), especially when their features are human-like (Burgoon et al., 2000; Krach et 
al., 2008), a phenomenon called anthropomorphism. Research on anthropomorphism has mainly 
focused on assessing attitudes about objects using explicit measures (Waytz, Gray, Epley, & 
Wegner, 2010; Wheatley, Milleville, & Martin, 2007). For example, it has been shown that 
computer programs are seen as more useful and elicit stronger feelings of being understood  when 
human features increase (Burgoon et al., 2000). In addition, people rate playful acting robots as 
being more extroverted and outgoing than more serious action robots (Goetz, Kiesler, & Powers, 
2003; Kiesler, & Goetz, 2002). Avatars are judged to be more trustworthy, competent, sensitive, 
and warm as the avatar is rated as more anthropomorphic (Gong, 2008). Despite this extensive 
body of research, not much is known about the possible consequences of anthropomorphism of 
objects on meaningful social behaviour. Do objects and non-human agents influence our social 
behaviour when we perceive them as human-like agents? Does it make us behave differently 
towards them? On the one hand, a large body of neuroscientific research found stronger 
activation of the action observation network (AON) when comparing human actions with non-
human actions (Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Ramnani & Miall, 2004). Research 
suggested this common coding system of perceived and executed actions (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, 
& Prinz, 2001; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003, 2005; Prinz, 
1997). This common coding approach suggests that action observation leads to automatic 
activation of motor representations in the observer, a mechanism called action co-representation. 
It has been argued that humans have an evolutionary preference for biological action, in the sense 
that co-representation of biological actions are functionally fundamentally different from 
representation of analogous, non-biological actions (Tsai, Kuo, Jing, Hung, & Tzeng, 2006). 
However, recent research demonstrates that under certain conditions action simulation of non-
biological actions is possible (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, under review), and that whether 
or not we simulate non-biological actions depends on the perceived agency of the non-biological 
agent. Co-representation of non-biological actions increases with perceived agency of this agent, 
meaning that people who ascribe agency to a non-biological agent treat this agent as if it was a 
human (Müller et al., 2011a; Ramsey, Hamilton, 2010; Stenzel et al., in press; Teufel, Fletcher, & 
Davis, 2010). In addition, increased self-other overlap and perceiving an agent as capable of 
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performing an action fosters co-representation of its actions (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Müller et al., 
2011b). 
 In a related domain, literature on imitation of non-verbal behaviours of humans showed 
that these motor representations have an influence on social behaviour, leading to more 
interpersonal closeness and more pro-social behaviours. For instance, we give more money to 
charity, and become more helpful in general when being mimicked (Ashton-James, van Baaren, 
Chartrand, Decety, & Karremans, 2007; van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009; 
van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, van Knippenberg, 2003). It has already been shown that 
anthropomorphism can activate people‘s associated concepts and automatically influence later 
behaviour. For example, when participants were primed with of dogs, the behaved consistent with 
the associated concept and thus more loyal than participants who were primed with cats 
(Chartrand, Fitzsimons, & Fitzsimons, 2008). The question remains however, whether such pro-
social effects observed in mimicry research occur when we simulate a non-biological agent. It has 
been suggested that interpersonal closeness may serve functions related to maintaining affiliation, 
and connectedness to other people and social groups (Ashton-James et al., 2007; Collett, 1971; 
Holland, Roeder, van Baaren, Brandt, & Hannover, 2004; Kahn & McGaughey, 1977; Salewski, 
1993). As interactions with advices and robots will become more and more frequent in the future, 
it is important to explore their influence on meaningful social behaviour, which may help to 
improve these interactions. Thus, the aim of the present studies was to test whether perceiving a 
non-biological agent behaving in a human-like manner leads to more interpersonal closeness, and 
more pro-social behaviour towards this agent. 
3.1. Study I  
3.1.2. Methods 
Fifty-seven female undergraduate students gave written informed consent before participating in 
this study. Upon arrival, they watched either a 5-minute video fragment of Walt Disney’s 
Pinocchio’ (non-biological condition), or the Dutch comedy ‘Everything is love’4 (biological 
condition) with the instruction to take the perspective of the main character (see Materials for 
more information about the video fragments). Subsequently, participants were told that the 
experimenter needed some time to prepare the second part of the experiment, and they were 
asked to take a seat in a waiting area. In this area, six chairs were lined up. Either the far left or 
right chair contained a jacket and a bag, suggesting the presence of another person (Macrae & 
Johnston, 1998), or a wooden Pinocchio puppet. The experiment had thus a 2 (movie: biological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Original title ‘Alles is liefde’, comparable to and based on the same concept on the english 
comedy ‘Love actually’. 
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vs. non-biological) x 2 (agent: another person vs. Pinocchio) between-subjects design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions, and the conditions were 
counterbalanced across subjects. When participants sat down, the experimenter approached them 
with another questionnaire containing questions concerning demographics (sex, age). 
Subsequently, participants were paid, thanked, and debriefed. 
3.1.2. Materials 
As in earlier research, two video fragments were used to insure increased perceived animacy of 
the agent (Müller et al., 2011a). The Pinocchio video fragment contained the scene in which the 
wooden Pinocchio is for the first time able to walk and talk. A dancing scene follows in which 
the others celebrate this event. Importantly, it is still clear that he is not a real human boy, as 
screws were still visible and he burns his finger without feeling pain, but being instead fascinated 
by the flame. The dutch comedy fragment was about a identity confusion which resulting in a 
funny discussion between the main character and someone else and a helpless try to put things 
right. This was followed by a scene in which the main character meets her new lover.  
 A pilot study revealed that evaluations of both film fragments did not differ between 
conditions (‘How amusing did you think the film was?’, ‘Could you form a vivid image of the 
main character?’, ‘Did you have the impression that the main character acted intentional?’, ‘Did 
you have the impression that the main character acted like a normal person?’, ‘Could you identify 
with the main character?’; all F‘s < 1, n.s.). Furthermore, we made sure that the fragments did not 
differ in number of actors who had an essential part in the fragment (Pinocchio: 5 actors; Love: 5 
actors). 
3.1.3. Results & Discussion 
A 2 (movie: biological vs. non-biological) x 2 (agent: another person vs. Pinocchio) ANOVA was 
conducted, with movie and agent as between-subjects factors, and distance between the chair the 
participant chose to sit on, and the chair with the bag or Pinocchio on it as dependent variable. 
This analysis revealed an interaction between movie and the presence of another agent, F(1,53) = 
3.93, p = .053, revealing that participants who saw the Pinocchio movie sat closer to the 
Pinocchio puppet (M = .84, SD = .99) than to another person (M = 2.13, SD = 1.06), F(1,53) = 
9.21, p = .004, while there was no differences in seating distance when participants saw the 
biological movie, F < 1, n.s..  
 These results suggest that observing a non-biological agent behaving in a human-like 
manner has profound effects on how we respond to these agents afterwards: it leads to more 
interpersonal closeness. In our second study, we tried to replicate these findings using a slightly 
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different setup: After watching either a 5-minute video fragment of Walt Disney’s ‘Pinocchio’, or 
a Dutch version of the comedy ‘Love actually’, participants were asked to take a seat in a line up 
of six chairs, with on one end a bag and a wooden puppet at the other end. Furthermore, we added 
a second measure to explore whether participants watching the Pinocchio movie also acted more 
pro-social towards a non-biological agent. They were asked to allocate lottery tickets to either 
another person, or Pinocchio.  
3.2. Study II 
3.2.1. Methods 
Forty-one female undergraduate students gave written informed consent before participating in 
this study. The procedure was the same as in the first study, except that on one end of the line-up, 
a bag and a jacket was placed, while on the other end, a Pinocchio puppet was placed. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. When participants sat down, 
the experimenter approached them with another questionnaire. Participants were instructed to 
divide seven lottery tickets, worth five euros each, between Pinocchio and another, unfamiliar 
person. This person was introduced as a woman from the Netherlands named Klaasje. Only her 
first name and sex was given, and no further information about the woman was provided. 
Subsequently, participants had to answer questions concerning demographics (sex, age), and were 
paid, thanked, and debriefed. 
3.2.2. Results 
 A 2 (movie: biological vs. non-biological) between-subjects factor ANOVA was 
conducted, with as first dependent variable the distance between the chair the participants chose 
to sit on, and the chair with Pinocchio on it. Participants who watched the non-biological movie 
sat closer to Pinocchio (M = 1.10, SD = .81) than participants who watched the biological movie 
(M = 1.64, SD = .79), F(1,39) = 4.51, p = .040. Furthermore, a 2 (movie: biological vs. non-
biological) x 2 (agent: Klaasje vs. Pinocchio) repeated measures analysis was conducted, with 
movie as between-subjects factor, and agent as within-subjects factor. As the distance between 
Pinocchio and the participant might have an influence on the dependent variable, we included 
seating distance as covariate to control for it. The second dependent variable was the number of 
lottery tickets assigned to Pinocchio and to Klaasje. How many lottery tickets were assigned to 
Pinocchio respectively Klaasje differed between conditions, F(1,37) = 4.27, p = .046. While 
participants who watched the biological movie assigned significantly less tickets to Pinocchio (M 
= 2.20, SE = 0.39) than to Klaasje (M = 4.81, SD = 0.39, p = .002), participants who watched the 
non-biological movie did not make such a distinction (MPinocchio = 3.21, SDPinocchio = 0.42; MKlaasje 
= 3.79, SDKlaasje = 0.42; p = .49; Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Differences in assigned lottery tickets to either another person or Pinocchio, depending 
on condition.  
3.3. General Discussion 
In the present study, we demonstrated that observing non-human agents behaving in a human-like 
way has an influence on meaningful social behaviour. In two studies, participants who watched 
Pinocchio behaving in a human-like way showed more interpersonal closeness afterwards, 
meaning that they sat closer to Pinocchio than to another, „real“ person, compared to participants 
who watched a biological movie. In addition, in our second study participants who watched the 
Pinocchio movie were as pro-social towards Pinocchio than to another person, i.e. assigned an 
equal amount of lottery tickets to the puppet as to a person, whereas participants who watched a 
biological movie gave significantly less lottery tickets to Pinocchio. This may „enable a sense of 
efficacy with these agents, a sense that actually increases one’s apparent competence interacting 
with these agents“ (Epley et al., 2007, page 879). The present findings extend literature on 
anthropomorphism that demonstrates that our attitudes become more positive the more we 
anthropomorphise (Burgoon et al., 2000; Epley et al., 2007, 2008; Goetz et al., 2003; Gong, 
2008; Kiesler & Goetz, 2002; Krach et al., 2008; Waytz et al., 2010; Wheatley et al., 2007) by 
showing that we also behave more positively towards these agents. In the future, it may be 
interesting to investigate whether the present findings can be replicated with less human-like non-
biological agents (e.g., a robot or an avatar), and to what extent non-biological agents need to 
possess human features to perceive them as vivid.  
 Furthermore, the present findings should be seen in relation to another important 
phenomenon when it comes to human - non-human interactions: the uncanny valley (Mori, 
1970). The more human-like an agent‘s appearance the more positive people‘s attitude becomes 
until one point at which the great similarity with a human leads to feelings of disconnection and 
awkwardness (e.g., Seyama, & Nagayama, 2007; Steckenfinger, & Ghazanfar, 2009). Thereby, it 
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is suggested that an congruency of appearance of the robot and movement kinematics is of 
special importance (e.g., Saygin, Chaminade, Ishiguro, Driver, & Frith, 2011). When both 
kinematics and appearance were clearly non-human activation in the AON was found, compared 
to situations in which appearance were human while kinematics were robotic. In addition, in the 
present research, we used an agent that had human features but was still clearly not too similar to 
a human. The question remains whether the present findings can be replicated with humanoid 
robots used to investigate the uncanny valley phenomenon. Based on the present findings, we 
assume that given people the possibility to anthropomorphise before interacting with a humanoid 
robot which are very close to humans in appearance and behaviour should improve the interaction 
with this robot and avoid an uncanny valley effect. However, further research is crucial to resolve 
this question. In light of earlier research, it could be enough to make people believe a robot is 
designed to be human-like to elicit pro-social behaviour (Stenzel et al., in press). 
 Furthermore, it is important to note that, although behavioural support for a common 
coding system for observed and executed actions is biological tuned seems evident, 
neuroscientific evidence is less clear. While a large body of research found stronger activation of 
the AON when comparing human actions with non-human actions (e.g., Costantini et al., 2005; 
Engel, Burke, Fiehler, Bien, & Rösier, 2008; Hogeveen, & Obhi, 2012; Miura et al., 2010; Tai et 
al., 2004), a couple of studies demonstrating that non-biological actions can activate the AON as 
much as biological actions (Cross et al., 2011; Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers 2007; 
Gobbini et al., 2011; Oberman, McCleery, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 2007; Saygin, Chaminade, 
Ishiguro, Driver, & Frith, 2012). For example, Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, and Keysers (2007) 
found no differences between human an non-human actions, independent of whether they were 
complex and suggested a goal or not. One explanation for a lack of differences between human 
and non-human actions that was suggested was the familiarity of the participants with the stimuli 
material: the more human-like the used stimuli act, i.e. human kinematics rather than constant 
velocity, the more similar the brain activation (see also Kilner, Hamilton, & Blakemore, 2007). 
 Our results show that when we anthropomorphise non-biological agents, we start to 
behave more pro-socially towards these non-biological agents. Especially the fact that watching a 
movie of Pinocchio led participants to give more lottery tickets to Pinocchio (and fewer to a real 
person) is striking. After all, on a conscious, rational level, all participants are most likely aware 
that a lottery ticket is not at all useful for Pinocchio. However, when we become immersed in a 
story with a non-biological agent, anthropomorphism can easily override such “cold” rational 
considerations. As interactions with interactive advices and robots will become more and more 
frequent in the future, the present findings could be used to optimise these interactions, and 
improve the usefulness of these agents.
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Chapter 
 
 
When triangles become human:  
Action co-representation for objects. 
 
 
Until recently, it was assumed that co-representation of others’ actions, an 
essential part in joint action, is biologically tuned. However, recent research 
demonstrated that we also simulate actions of non-biological interaction 
partners under certain conditions. In three studies, we explored whether the 
non-biological interaction partner needs to posses human features for action 
co-representation to occur. In a first baseline experiment, we demonstrated that 
participants who performed a social Simon task with an animated human hand 
and an animated object (i.e., a ball) only co-represented actions of the 
biological interaction partner. In the second study, it was found that 
participants did not co-represent actions of an object after they were merely 
presented with a picture of the same object before performing the social Simon 
task, but they did co-represent actions of this object after they watched a video 
fragment which displayed the object in a self-propelled way. In our third study, 
we demonstrated that only perspective-taking, but not perceived intentionality, 
has an influence on action co-representation of non-biological actions. Possible 
explanations for these findings are discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: Barbara C. N. Müller, Anna K. Oostendorp, Simone Kühn, Marcel Brass, Ap Dijksterhuis, & 
Rick B. van Baaren (in prep). When triangles become human: Action co-representation for objects.
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Joint action is essential for social interaction (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). To 
coordinate our actions with the actions of people around us, the literature suggests a common 
coding system of perceived and executed actions: action observation leads to automatic activation 
of motor representations in the observer (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 
2001; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003; 2005; Prinz, 1997). This motor simulation mechanism is 
called co-representation of action. Researchers have assumed that this common coding system is 
biologically tuned (e.g., Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003), but recently it has been shown 
that perceived intentionality and taking the perspective of ones interaction partner may possibly 
explain the differences found between action co-representation of biological- and non-biological 
actions in earlier studies (e.g., Müller et al., 2011a, 2011b; Stenzel et al., in press). Thus, research 
about whether actions need to be biological or not to be co-represented is mixed. Furthermore, 
when actions of non-biological agents can be co-represented under certain conditions, the 
questions remains whether these agents need to posses human features to make action co-
representation possible. The present research investigates whether human features need to be 
present and what the underlying mechanisms for action co-representation are. 
 Different studies showed that action co-representation is restricted to biological actions, 
and does not occur when the actions are performed by non-biological agents (e.g., a robot or a 
wooden hand, Kilner et al., 2003; Tai et al., 2004; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai et al., 2008; Ramnani 
& Miall, 2004; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). It has been argued that humans have an evolutionary 
preference for biological action, in the sense that co-representation of biological actions are 
functionally different from representation of analogous, non-biological actions (Tsai et al., 2006). 
However, recent research demonstrated that whether we simulate actions or not is influenced by 
other processes, such as whether the actions of others serve as a spatial reference for one`s own 
actions (Dolk et al., 2011), group membership of the interaction partner (Müller et al., 2011b), or 
liking (Hommel, Colzato, & van den Wildenberg, 2009). Furthermore, recent research 
demonstrated that action co-representation is not necessarily biologically tuned, but can occur if 
people ascribe intentionality to a non-biological interaction partner (Müller et al., 2011a). 
Participants who took the perspective of the non-biological agent and ascribed intentionality to a 
wooden puppet, i.e. by watching a short videoclip of Walt Disney‘s Pinocchio, subsequently 
simulated actions of a wooden hand they interacted with in a social Simon task. Participants who 
did not have the possibility to ascribe intentionality only simulated actions of a human interaction 
partner. Comparable results were found when participants had to interact with a artificial robot 
that was introduced as either human-like or not (Stenzel et al., in press).  
 However, this research leaves an important questions unanswered: Firstly, Pinocchio has a 
lot of human-like features, which possibly makes it easier to ascribe intentionality (e.g., Burgoon 
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et al., 2000). But what happens when the interaction partner has no human features? How 
important is the inanimate object’s physical similarity to humans? Although there is some 
evidence that the human form influences the common coding network, and that this network is 
activated when observing biological actions but not when observing non-biological actions (e.g., 
Brass et al., 2001; Press, 2011), other studies fail to show differences between human-like and 
non-human-like actions (Castelli et al., 2000; Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007; 
Ramsey & Hamilton, 2010; Schultz Friston, O`Doherty, Wolpert, & Frith, 2005; Wheatley, 
Milleville, & Martin, 2007). Hence, there is reason to assume that action co-representation does 
not necessarily rely on human features. For example, it has been demonstrated that simple 
moving shapes can elicit activation in brain regions involved in perception of biological actions, 
and the attribution of mental states to other people (mPFC, STS, fusiform gyrus, Castelli et al., 
2000, Wheatley et al., 2007). Furthermore, research shows that action co-representation also 
depends on the observer`s knowledge about the non-biological agent (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; 
Stenzel et al., in press). Thus, top down processes influence whether people simulate actions or 
not, which makes it possible to co-represent actions of objects which have clearly nothing in 
common with human beings. 
 In the present research, we try to clarify this issue by removing all biological features of 
the non-biological interaction partner. Additionally, we try to disentangle the influence of 
perceived intentionality and perspective-taking (Study III). Our first study explores whether 
interaction partners need to posses human features in order for action co-representation to occur. 
Participants performed a social Simon task with either a biological interaction partner or a non-
biological interaction partner, i.e. a yellow ball. The social Simon task is a useful tool to 
investigate co-representation of action (Sebanz et al., 2003; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai, Kuo, Jing, 
Hung, & Tzeng, 2006). In the classical Simon task participants have to respond to the colour of a 
stimulus (e.g., pressing a left key when a red stimulus appears or pressing a right key when a 
green stimulus appears on the screen) while ignoring the spatial location of the stimulus. The 
Simon effect refers to the finding that participants respond slower when the spatial relationship 
between stimulus and response is incompatible (e.g., pressing a left key in response to a stimulus 
on the right) than when it is compatible (e.g., pressing a left key in response to a stimulus on the 
left). The typical Simon effect disappears when participants only respond to one stimulus (e.g., to 
the green stimulus with a right response but not to the red stimulus) in a go/no-go version of the 
task. The reason is that a left response is only coded as left when it is encoded in context of a 
meaningful right response (Sebanz et al., 2003). The Simon effect reappears when participants 
interact with somebody else who carries out the alternative response (Sebanz et al., 2003). In a 
social setting, participants co-represent the action of their interaction partner leading to a 
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reappearance of the Simon effect. Based on earlier research (e.g., Müller et al., 2011a; Müller et 
al., 2011b), we expected that participants only co-represent the actions of the biological agent, 
while non-biological actions would not be co-represented.  
4.1. Study I 
4.1.1. Methods 
4.1.1.1. Participants and design 
Twenty-five students from the Radboud University Nijmegen (5 male, age 18 – 26 years, Mage = 
21.08, SD = 2.22) received credit points or financial compensation for their participation. All 
participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment 
consisted of a single factor (Interaction partner: biological agent vs. non-biological agent) within-
subjects design. 
4.1.1.2. Materials and procedure 
All participants performed an identical Simon task with an animated human hand and an 
animated yellow ball. They put their right hand on a 17 in. LCD screen where a single response 
key was placed. At the centre of the screen, the standard Simon stimulus - a rectangle 
surrounding three horizontally arranged circles - was presented. On each trial, one of the circles 
was either coloured green or red.     
 In all conditions, an image of either a human or yellow ball was displayed on the left side 
of the screen. Participants had to respond whenever a green dot appeared on the screen. The hand 
respectively the ball displayed on the left side ‘responded’ to red targets, pressing a button on 
participants’ no-go trials. In the biological condition, a five-frame image sequence (38 ms per 
frame) was presented. It showed the hand in different postures, with the index finger approaching 
the response button. The first image of this sequence was used as fixation display. In the non-
biological condition, a five-frame image sequence (38 ms per frame) was presented, which 
showed a yellow ball at different positions, thereby approaching the response button. The first 
image of this sequence was used as fixation display. 
 No-go trials were preceded by a 500 ms fixation display. Then, a red target was presented 
for 150 ms. After a variable interval (300 – 450 ms), the image sequence started. Finally, the 
fixation display was presented (1000 ms). Go trials also started with a 500 ms fixation display. 
Next, a green target was presented for 150 ms. Reaction times (RT) were recorded from the onset 
of the target. Participants were instructed to respond to the green targets as quickly as possible, 
without making too many errors.  
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 There were 45 go trials and 45 no-go trials for the human hand condition and the wooden 
hand condition (20 go/compatible trials; 20 go/incompatible trials; 5 go trials where the target 
was presented in the middle). The order of the conditions was counterbalanced across subjects. 
To prevent carry-over effects, we introduced a 2-minutes break between conditions. 
Subsequently, participants were thanked, debriefed, and paid.  
4.1.2. Results & Discussion 
All trials with RTs below 150 ms or above 800 ms (0.9%) were excluded. Difference scores were 
calculated by subtracting the average RT of compatible trials from the average RT of 
incompatible trials. RTs were log-transformed, but untransformed RTs are reported in ms. One 
participant with difference scores of 2.5 SD’s above the mean was excluded from further 
analyses5. 
A single-factor (Interaction partner: biological agent vs. non-biological agent) repeated-
measures analysis on the mean difference scores revealed a marginal effect of interaction partner, 
F(1,23) = 3.83, p = .063, ηρ² = .14 (Figure 1). Participants showed the expected compatibility 
effect when co-acting with a biological agent (M = 10ms; SE = 5, p = .037), however, no 
compatibility effect occurred with a co-acting non-biological agent (M = -1ms; SE = 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean Difference Scores (Incompatible - Compatible) in the Human and Non-human 
Conditions of the Social Simon Task. 
 
 In sum, whereas participants showed a compatibility effect when interacting with a 
biological agent, no compatibility effect was found when participants interacted with an object, 
which is in line with research demonstrating that higher order processes influence action co-
representation (Hommel et al., 2009; Müller et al., 2011a, 2011b). In our second study, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5No differences were found on whether participants attend more to the triangle than on the human 
hand, F < 1, n.s. 
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investigated whether perceived intentionality of the object would influence action co-
representation. We manipulated intentionality of the object by presenting two different types of 
video fragments of the object (i.e., moving conditions) or a picture (i.e., non-moving condition). 
Participants saw either two types of video fragments: a short video clip containing an triangle 
behaving in an way suggesting Theory of mind (ToM), or a triangle moving in a predictable, but 
non-intentional manner (Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000). In the non-moving condition, 
participants were presented with a picture of the same object. As people easily perceive 
intentionality in moving objects (e.g., Ramsey & Hamilton, 2010) we predicted that compatibility 
effects during interaction with an object would only be present after watching the ToM video 
fragment beforehand. However, no compatibility effect was expected when participants were 
presented with an object moving in a predictable way or a picture beforehand.  
4.2. Study II 
4.2.1. Methods 
4.2.1.1. Participants and design 
Sixty-eight female participants from Radboud University Nijmegen (18 - 29 years, Mage = 21.13, 
SD = 2.47) received credit points or financial compensation for their participation. All 
participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment 
consisted of a single factor (Prime: ToM vs. predictable vs. picture) between-subjects design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. 
4.2.1.2. Material and procedure 
Participants watched an animation of about 45 seconds that portrayed a red and a blue triangle, 
moving around an abstract sketch of a ground plan of a house (Castelli et al., 2000). They were 
instructed to watch the animation carefully and to concentrate on the red triangle, which 
resembled the main character. In the ToM condition, participants saw a sequence in which the 
movements could be interpreted as one triangle „surprising“ another triangle. In the predictable 
movement condition, the two triangles were moving from the left side to the right side of the 
screen. The basic visual characteristics in terms of shape, overall speed, and orientation changes 
were similar in both fragments. In the picture condition, participants saw a screen shot of one of 
the movies for about 15 seconds. Subsequently, participants had to indicate how well they could 
form an impression of the main character they had to focus on, answering one question of the 
transportation scale (‘While seeing the movie, I could form a vivid image of the red triangle’) 
using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = do not agree, 7 = agree). Research has demonstrated that the 
vividness of the main character might influence action co-representation (Müller et al., 2011a). 
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Then, all participants performed the same social Simon tasks described in Study I, however this 
time with an animated red triangle as interaction partner, responding to no-go trials.       
4.2.2. Results and Discussion 
4.2.2.1. Manipulation check  
We expected that participants in the ToM condition could form a more vivid image of the triangle 
than participants in the predictable movement condition and in the picture condition. However, 
the impression formation scores between the ToM and the predictable movement condition did 
not differ, t < 1, n.s.. Furthermore, participants in the ToM condition could form a better 
impression of the triangle (M = 4.72, SD = 1.28) than participants in the picture condition (M = 
2.79, SD = 2.78), t(37) = 4.99, p < .001, and participants in the predictable movement condition 
could form a better impression of the triangle (M = 4.50, SD = 1.46) than participants in the 
picture condition, t(38) = 3.99, p < .001. As the manipulation seemingly did not work as 
intended, we adjusted our hypothesis and expected that both participants in the ToM condition 
and in the predictable movement condition would show a compatibility effect in RTs of the 
Simon effect when interacting with the triangle.  
4.2.2.2. Social Simon effect 
All trials with RTs below 150 ms or above 800 ms (1.8%) were excluded. Difference scores were 
calculated by subtracting the average RT of compatible trials from the average RT of 
incompatible trials. RTs were log-transformed, but untransformed RTs are reported in ms. Three 
participants with RTs 2.5 SD’s above the mean were excluded from further analysis6.  
 The expected effect that both participants in the ToM condition and in the predictable 
movement condition would show a compatibility effect in RTs of the Simon effect when 
interacting with the triangle was not significant, F (1,62) = 2.44, p = .123. Nevertheless, when 
looking at the simple effects, both participants in the ToM and in the predictable movement 
conditions showed a significant Simon effect (ToM: M = 9ms, SE = 3; predictable: M = 11ms, SE 
= 3), while participants in the picture condition showed no Simon effect (M = 1ms, SE = 5, Figure 
2). Comparisons of the mean RTs of compatible and incompatible trials of the three conditions 
revealed that there was a significant compatibility effect in the ToM condition (p = .003) and in 
the predictable movement condition (p = .004), while the compatibility effect in the picture 
condition was non-significant (p = .891). The difference between the ToM condition and the 
picture condition was not significant, t(37) = 1.12, p = .135), the difference between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 No differences were found on whether participants attend more to the triangle depending on 
condition, F (2,64) = 1.14, p > .30. 
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predictable movement condition and the picture condition was significant, t(38) = 1.73, p = .045 
(both one-sided). The correlation between the vividness score and the Simon effect was not 
significant. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean Difference Scores (Incompatible - Compatible) of the Social Simon Task as a 
Function of Prime (ToM vs. Predictable vs. Picture). 
 Participants showed a compatibility effect after watchng a moving triangle, independent 
of whether these movements represented ToM or predictable movements, while no such effect 
was found after being presented with a picture of the triangle. However, what the underlying 
processes are is not clear yet. Based on earlier research, two explanations are possible: Firstly, it 
could be that participants in the ToM and predictable movement conditions more easily took the 
perspective of the triangle, while this was not the case in the picture condition (e.g., Müller et al., 
2011b). Secondly, it might be the case that participants spontaneously ascribed intentionality to 
the triangle, independent of whether the movements could be described as intentional or not, 
while this was not the case when the triangle did not move (e.g., Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 
2007). The second explanation would be in line with research on self-propelledness, that is 
something is moving out of its own, demonstrating that whether an object moves out of its own 
or not is an essential part in perceived ToM (e.g., Leslie, 1994). In our third study, we therefore 
try to disentangle the mechanisms that could possibly have had an influence on the present 
findings by manipulation the degree of perspective-taking and the degree of intentionality of the 
triangle.  
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4.3. Study III 
4.3.1. Methods 
4.3.1.1. Participants and design 
One-hundred-and-four students (92 women, 17 to 55 years, Mage = 22.73, SD = 5.25) from the 
Radboud University Nijmegen received credit points or a financial compensation for their 
participation. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
The experiment consisted of a 2 (Description: intentional vs. random) x 2 (Instruction: 
perspective-taking vs. objective) x 2 (Interaction partner: biological agent vs. non-biological 
agent) mixed design, with description and instruction as between-subjects factor, and interaction 
partner as within-subjects factor. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions. 
4.3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were seated in front of a computer screen. After 
answering some questions concerning their demographic background, they watched a video clip 
of 70 seconds length. The clip portrayed a red and a blue triangle, moving randomly around an 
abstract sketch of a ground plan of a house (see Castelli et al., 2000). The fragment was chosen in 
such a way that the triangles’ movements would not clearly suggest underlying intentions to 
prevent automatic perspective-taking. To manipulate the attribution of intentions to the triangles, 
the movie contained subtitles describing the triangles’ movements in episodes of about 10 
seconds. These descriptions were either emphasising the randomness of the movements (e.g., 
‘The geometrical shapes are programmed to randomly turn around the square’) or their 
intentionality by integrating the triangles’ movements into a story of two friends looking for their 
pet (e.g., ‘The two friends first want to look around the house and, full of hope, they decide to 
split up’). To manipulate perspective-taking of the portrayed triangles, participants were 
instructed to either take the perspective of the red triangle and identify with it, or to stay objective 
and distant while watching the video. After watching the fragment, participants had to indicate 
how well they could form an impression of the main character they had to focus on, answering 
one question of the transportation scale (‘While seeing the movie, I could form a vivid image of 
the red triangle’), using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = do not agree, 7 = agree). Subsequently, all 
participants performed the same social Simon tasks described in Study II, interacting with either a 
human hand or a red triangle.  
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4.3.2. Results 
4.3.2.1. Manipulation check 
A 2 (Description: intentional vs. random) x 2 (Instruction: perspective-taking vs. objective) 
analysis of variance with perceived vividness as dependent variable revealed a significant effect 
of Description, F(1,125) = 4.51, p = .036, ηρ² = .04, with participants who watched the intentional 
movie having higher impression formation scores (M = 2.95, SD = 1.16) than participant 
watching the random movie (M = 2.54, SD = 1.11). In addition, there was a significant effect of 
Instruction, F(1,125) = 4.99, p = .027, ηρ² = .04, with participants who took the perspective of the 
triangle having higher impression formation scores (M = 2.97, SD = 1.15) than participant who 
did not take the perspective of the triangle (M = 2.53, SD = 1.11). The interaction was not 
significant, F < 1. 
4.3.2.2. Social Simon effect 
All trials with RTs below 150 ms or above 800 ms (1.9%) were excluded. Difference scores were 
calculated by subtracting the average RT of compatible trials from the average RT of 
incompatible trials. RTs were log-transformed, but untransformed RTs are reported in ms. 
A 2 (Description: intentional vs. random) x 2 (Instruction: perspective-taking vs. 
objective) x 2 (Interaction partner: biological agent vs. non-biological agent) repeated measure 
analysis on the different scores revealed a significant effect of instruction, F(1,125) = 5.94, p = 
.016, ηρ² = .05. Participants who took the perspective of the triangle had a stronger compatibility 
effect (M = 12ms, SE = 2) than participants who merely saw the triangle as an object (M = 5ms, 
SE = 2). The main effect of description was not significant nor was the main effect of interaction 
partner, both F‘s < 1. Furthermore, all two way interactions were not significant, all F`s < 1. The 
interaction between description, instruction, and interaction partner was non-significant F(1,125) 
= 2.38, p = .125, ηρ² = .02.  
However, as the interaction approached statistical significance, separate ANOVAs were 
conducted for both the triangle and the human hand as interaction partner, with description and 
instruction as between-subject factor and the log-transformed difference scores between the 
congruent and the incongruent trials as dependent variable. For the triangle, the interaction was 
non-significant, as was the effect of description, both F‘s < 1. However, there was a significant 
effect for instruction, F(1,125) = 5.41, p = .022, ηρ² = .04 (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Mean Difference Scores (Incompatible - Compatible) of the Social Simon Task as 
Function of Description (Intentional vs. Random) and Instruction (Perspective-taking vs. 
Objective). 
On average, participants taking the triangle’s perspective had a stronger compatibility 
effect than other participants (Mperspective-taking = 14 ms, SEperspective-taking = 3 vs. Mobjective = 5 ms, 
SEobjective = 3). Comparisons of the mean RTs of compatible and incompatible trials of the four 
conditions revealed that there was a significant compatibility effect in the intentional-perspective-
taking condition (M = 14ms, p = .003), in the intentional-objective condition (M = 8ms, p = .038), 
as well as in the random-perspective-taking condition (M = 14ms, p = .008). The compatibility 
effect in the random-objective condition was non-significant (M = 1ms, p = .748).  
In the human hand-condition, there were no significant main effects for instruction (F < 1) 
or description (F(1,125) = 1.46, p = .230). Furthermore, the interaction between instruction and 
description was non-significant F(1,125) = 2.13, p = .147. 
4.4. General discussion 
In the present research, we investigated whether human features are necessary for action co-
representation to occur, and whether perceived intentionality or perspective-taking are 
responsible for the effects described in earlier studies. The results of our first study demonstrated 
that non-human actions performed by an agent without any human features are co-represented 
differently than human actions. While participants co-represented actions of a human interaction 
partner, they did not co-represent actions of a moving yellow ball. In the second study, co-
representation of an objects‘ actions could be induced by presenting participants with video 
fragments of the object moving around beforehand. Participants who watched these movies co-
represented non-biological actions, while participants who just saw a picture did not co-represent 
non-biological actions. In the third study, we clarified the influence of perspective-taking and 
perceived intentionality on action co-representation of non-biological actions. Participants only 
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co-represented actions of objects after they took the perspective of the object, independent of 
whether the movements of the object were described as intentional or random. We could 
demonstrate that action co-representation also occurs for less human-like non-biological agents, 
such as a simple triangle, and that action co-representation occurs after taking the perspective of 
the interaction partner. Thus, whether action co-representation occurs or not depends on higher 
order processes and is solely biological tuned (see also Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Müller et al., 
2011a; Stenzel et al., in press; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). 
Co-representation of actions performed by a non-biological agent with no human features 
can occur after watching a video of this agent moving in a self-propelled way (Study II). Thereby, 
no differences were found between a ToM video fragment or the predictable movement fragment. 
This could be explained by the fact that the impression participants could form of the moving 
object did not differ between these two conditions. Recent research on the influence of perceived 
intentionality on action co-representation demonstrates that the vividness of the object has an 
important influence on the occurrence of action co-representation (Müller et al., 2011a). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that self-propelledness is an essential part in ascribing ToM and 
animacy towards objects (Leslie, 1994). Thus, the fact that in both movies, the triangle was 
moving out of its own might be responsible that in both conditions, actions of the triangle were 
co-represented. 
Most importantly, we could demonstrate in study III that perspective-taking is the driving 
factor that increases action co-representation. In earlier studies, it has been shown that watching a 
video fragment of Pinocchio leads to action co-representation of a wooden non-biological agent 
afterwards (Müller et al., 2011a), and it was assumed that perceiving Pinocchio acting intentional 
is responsible for these results. However, these findings could also be explained by participants 
who took the perspective of Pinocchio during presentations of the video fragment. Narratives 
increase identification with television characters and avatars in video games, which in turn is 
assumed to influence later behaviour (e.g., Schneider, Lang, Shin, & Bradley, 2004), and people 
tend to spontaneously take the perspective of other people (e.g., Böckler & Zwickel, in press). 
Thus although in some studies participants were not directly instructed to take the perspective of 
their interaction partner (Stenzel et al., in press), it may be possible that participants 
spontaneously took the perspective of the non-biological interaction partner.  
It could be speculated whether perspective-taking increase the self-other overlap between 
co-actors, which leads to an overlap in representations of actions performed by oneself and 
actions performed by the interaction partner (see also Hommel et al., 2009). However, as 
perspective-taking increases both positivity towards others, as well as self-other overlap between 
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interaction partners (Batson et al., 1997) the question remains which underlying mechanisms are 
exactly working here, and whether increased self-other overlap or increased positivity is 
responsible for our findings. Based on the literature, both explanations are possible: It has been 
argued that action co-representation partly depends on the perceived overlap of one’s 
representation of the self and the representation of the interaction partner (Müller et al., 2011b). 
In addition, recent research demonstrates that the valence of the interaction influences action co-
representation (Hommel et al., 2009). However, a positive relationship with an interaction partner 
increases self-other overlap (Aron et al., 1991), and it seems difficult to disentangle positivity and 
self-other overlap as the possible underlying mechanism. Further research is definitely needed to 
clarify this issue. In addition, interpretations of the results when participants interacted with a 
human hand seem difficult. Based on earlier research, we would assume that RTs are influenced 
by the vividness of the impression participants formed of the non-biological agent (Müller et al., 
2011a). However, we did not find any support for this influence in the present research, and need 
additional investigation.  
In follow up research it would be advisable to control for possible salience effects of non-
biological movements, for example by presenting a movie of an interaction between a human and 
a non-biological agent. A growing body of research explores whether the social Simon effect is 
based on the spatial salience introduced by a co-actor rather than a measurement for action co-
representation (Dittrich, Rothe, & Klauer, 2012; Dolk et al., 2011; Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & 
Liepelt, submitted; Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010). These studies demonstrate, for 
example, that a compatibility effect also occurs when a random moving or sound-making object 
(i.e., a japanese Lucky Cat, a clock, or a metronome) is placed on the left side of the participant 
(Dolk et al., submitted), or that the social Simon effect could be found only if the interaction 
partner was sitting within arm reach of the participants (Guagnano et al., 2010). However, we 
think that until now these studies could not fully eliminate the social component in their designs. 
Both results could be explained by a decrease in self-other overlap with an increase in distance 
between actor and co-actor, which would be in line with our argumentation that an increase in 
self-other overlap invoked by perspective-taking fosters action co-representation. Furthermore, 
explicit ratings of whether participants attended more to one of the two different types of 
interaction partner (study I), or whether attention ratings differ between conditions (study II) did 
not yield any significant differences. Another explanation might be that two separate mechanisms 
are at work here: both spatial salience as well as perspective-taking could influence the 
compatibility effects of the social Simon task. Thus, when two participants are performing the 
social Simon task, an compatibility effect occurs because actions of the co-actor are co-
represented, depending on the self-other overlap between the two interaction partners. However, 
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a compatibility effect can also occur when the left response is salient, which does not per se need 
to be a sign for the fact that actions are co-represented. To answer this question, further research 
should focus on the underlying mechanisms of the social Simon effect. 
In the present research, we could demonstrate that action co-representation of non-human 
agents is not depending on human features possessed by the agent. Even if we interact with such 
abstract forms such as a triangle, which is very dissimilar to our own appearance, we co-represent 
its actions. Additionally, we could clearly show that perspective-taking is the driving factor 
influencing this process.  
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Chapter 
 
 
Perspective-taking eliminates differences  
in co-representation of out-group members’ actions. 
 
Coordinated action relies on shared representations between interaction 
partners: people co-represent actions of others in order to respond 
appropriately. However, little is known about the social factors that influence 
shared representations. We investigated whether actions performed by in-group 
and out-group members are represented differently, and if so, what role 
perspective-taking plays in this process. White participants performed a social 
Simon task with an animated image of a hand with either white or black skin 
tone. Results of Study I demonstrated that actions performed by in-group 
members were co-represented while actions of out-group members were not. In 
Study II, it was found that participants co-represented actions of out-group 
members when they had read about an out-group member and to take his 
perspective prior to the actual experiment. Possible explanations for these 
findings are discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on: Barbara C. N. Müller, Simone Kühn, Rick B. van Baaren, Ron Dotsch, Marcel Brass, Ap 
Dijksterhuis (2011). Perspective taking eliminates differences in co-representation of out-group members’ 
actions. Experimental Brain Research, 211, 423-428. 
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Observing the actions of others leads to automatic activation of motor representations in the 
observer (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Sebanz, Knoblich, & 
Prinz, 2003, 2005; Prinz, 1997), a phenomenon termed action co-representation. Co-
representation of actions is an essential process for successful social interaction, supporting the 
understanding of others’ actions, goals, and feelings of others (e.g., Preston & de Waal, 2002). 
Recent research demonstrated that representing others’ actions is not as universally applicable as 
previously suggested, but that higher-order processes can have a strong impact on shared action 
representations. For instance, co-representation only occurs when the interaction partner is 
perceived as an intentional agent (Müller et al., 2011a; Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the valence of interpersonal interactions has a strong impact 
on how people represent others and their actions (Hommel, Colzato, & van den Wildenberg, 
2009). In their study, Hommel and colleagues demonstrate that only positive interactions lead to 
action co-representation, while negative interactions between jointly acting participants 
eliminated co-representation of action. The authors suggested that action co-representation is a 
flexible phenomenon that depends on social factors.  
One of the most important social factors in human social interactions is group 
membership. According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people derive a 
substantial part of their self-concept from membership in social groups. It has been shown that 
out-group members are evaluated more negatively than in-group members (Brewer, 1979), and 
that self-other overlap increases when people belong to the same group (e.g., Aron et al., 2005). 
Prior literature already demonstrated a modulation of error-related brain activity during 
observation of actions performed by in-group vs. out-group members in a competitive context 
(Newman-Norlund, Ganesh, van Schie, de Bruijn, & Bekkering, 2009), and differences in motor 
cortex activation during observation of in-group vs. out-group members‘ actions were found 
(Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010). Our first study tries to extend these findings by showing that even 
outside a competitive context, actions performed by out-group members are co-represented less 
than actions performed by in-group members. Furthermore, as little is known about how fixed 
this moderation of co-representation by social factors may be, study II was conducted to explore 
whether the influence of social factors is flexible, and whether this can be manipulated by 
perspective-taking. 
  In both studies we used the social Simon task to measure action co-representation 
(Hommel et al., 2009; Sebanz et al., 2003; Tsai & Brass, 2007; Tsai, Kuo, Jing, Hung, & Tzeng, 
2006). In the classical Simon task participants respond to the colour of a stimulus (e.g., pressing a 
left key when a red stimulus appears or pressing a right key when a green stimulus appears on the 
screen) while ignoring the spatial location of the stimulus. The Simon effect refers to the finding 
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that participants respond slower when the spatial relationship between stimulus and response is 
incompatible (e.g., pressing a left key in response to a stimulus on the right) than when it is 
compatible (e.g., pressing a left key in response to a stimulus on the left). The typical Simon 
effect disappears when participants respond only to one stimulus colour (e.g., to the green stimuli 
with a right response but not to the red stimuli) in a go/no-go version of the task. Probably, the 
reason is that a left response is only coded as left when it is encoded in a context in which there 
are meaningful right responses on the right. The Simon effect reappears when participants 
perform the task jointly with another person carrying out the alternative response (Sebanz et al., 
2003). In a social setting, participants seemingly co-represent the action of interaction partners in 
a manner that leads to a reappearance of the Simon effect. 
 In the first study, white participants performed a social Simon task, co-acting with either a 
white in-group member or a black out-group member. We expected that the actions of an in-
group member would be co-represented, whereas actions of out-group members would not be co-
represented.  
5.1. Study I 
5.1.1. Methods 
5.1.1.1. Participants  
Twenty-seven white students from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated in this 
experiment (22 female; 17 – 26 years). They received course credit or financial compensation for 
their participation. All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. 
5.1.1.2. Experimental design, materials, and procedure 
The experiment consisted of a 2 (hand colour: White vs. Black) x 2 (compatibility: Compatible 
vs. Incompatible) repeated-measures design, with hand colour and compatibility as within-subject 
factors. All participants performed the same social Simon task, which is essentially a go/no-go 
task. They put their right hand on the right-handed side of a 17" LCD screen, where a single 
response key was located. At the centre of the screen, the standard Simon stimulus was presented, 
a rectangle surrounding three horizontally arranged circles. In each trial, one of the circles was 
coloured either green or red. In all conditions, an image of either a white or black left hand was 
displayed along the left-hand side of the screen in each trial. These hands differed only in skin 
colour and were matched for shape and size (Figure 1). Participants were instructed to press the 
response key with their right hand whenever a red dot appeared on the screen, regardless of the 
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position of the dot. The hand displayed along the left side ‘responded’ to green dots, thus pressing 
a button on participants’ no-go trials. A five-frame image sequence (38 ms per frame) was 
presented, showing the hand in a series of postures with the index finger approaching the 
response button. The first image of this sequence was used as a fixation display. 
Figure 1. Sample Frames of the White Hand and Black Hand. 
 No-go trials were preceded by a 500 ms fixation display. A green target was then 
presented for 150 ms. After a variable interval (300 – 450 ms), the image sequence started. 
Lastly, a fixation display was presented (1000 ms). Go trials also started with a 500 ms fixation 
display. Next, a red target was presented for 150 ms. RTs were measured from the onset of the 
target. Participants were instructed to respond for red targets as quickly as possible, without 
making too many errors. Response times (RTs) were recorded from the onset of the target. 
Participants were instructed to respond to the red targets as quickly as possible, without making 
errors.  
 The experiment included 45 go trials and 45 no-go trials for both the white and the black 
hand conditions (20 go/compatible trials; 20 go/incompatible trials; 5 go/neutral trials where the 
target was presented in the centre position). All participants performed two blocks of the social 
Simon task, one with a white hand and one with a black hand. The order of these blocks was 
counterbalanced across subjects. To prevent carry-over effects between conditions, a 2-minute 
break between blocks was employed.        
5.1.2. Results and Discussion 
All trials with reaction times (RTs) above 1500 ms or below 150 ms (3 trials, 0.1%) were 
excluded from further analyses. RTs were log-transformed, but untransformed RTs are reported 
in ms. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the average RT of compatible trials from 
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the average RT of incompatible trials. Two participants with difference scores 2.5 SD’s above the 
mean were excluded from further analysis.  
A 2 (hand colour: White vs. Black) x 2 (compatibility: Compatible vs. Incompatible) 
GLM repeated-measures analysis revealed a significant main effect of compatibility: participants 
were slower on incompatible trials (M = 379; SE = 10) than on compatible trials (M = 369; SE = 
10), F(1,24) = 15.36, p = .001, ηρ² = .39. The main effect of hand colour was not significant, 
F(1,24) = 1.95, p = .18. Furthermore, a significant interaction between hand colour and 
compatibility was obtained, F(1,24) = 4.82, p = .04, ηρ² = .17 (Figure 2). Bonferroni-corrected 
post-hoc comparisons revealed that with a co-acting white agent, participants showed the 
expected compatibility effect, with slower RTs for incompatible trials (M = 385; SE = 9) than on 
compatible trials (M = 370; SE = 9), F(1,24) = 19.08, p = .001, ηρ² = .44. However, no 
compatibility effect occurred with a co-acting black agent, F(1,24) = 2.04, p = .17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean Reaction Times of the Social Simon Task as a Function of Interaction Partner 
(White vs. Black) and Compatibility (Compatible vs. Incompatible Trials). 
In sum, whereas participants were faster for compatible than on incompatible trials when 
interacting with a white in-group member, no compatibility effect was obtained for interactions 
with a black out-group member. Thus, actions were co-represented only when both actor and co-
actor belonged to the same group, thereby supporting findings demonstrating that higher order 
processes can influence action co-representation (Hommel et al., 2009; Müller et al., 2011a). In 
Study II, we explored how flexible these biases are by instructing participants to take the 
perspective of an out-group member before interacting with another member of the same out-
group. We predicted that by taking the perspective of an out-group member the lack of 
compatibility effects in interactions with black out-group members would be eliminated. 
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5.2. Study II 
Research on stereotypes demonstrated that both the expression and accessibility of stereotypes for 
out-group members decrease after perspective-taking (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and that 
taking the perspective of an out-group member results in more positive attitudes towards out-
group members (Batson et al., 1997; Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002). For example, 
people are more likely to ascribe self-descriptive traits onto a target person after taking that 
person’s perspective (Davis et al., 1996). Moreover, perspective takers better understand the 
actions of others (Lozano, Hard, & Tversky, 2006). Galinsky, Ku, and Wang (2005) suggested 
that these positive consequences of perspective-taking results from increased self-other overlap in 
cognitive representations (see also Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). Based on these 
findings, we hypothesised that taking the perspective of an out-group member would lead to 
stronger co-representation of the out-group member’s actions. In the second study, white 
participants read a story about either a white in-group member or a black out-group member (a 
Surinamese man, member of a stigmatised immigrant group in the Netherlands; Verkuyten & 
Thijs, 2002), and were asked to take the perspective of the main character, before performing a 
social Simon task with a white or black co-actor (displayed as a hand on the monitor).  
5.2.1. Methods 
5.2.1.1. Participants  
Forty-three white undergraduate students from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated in 
the study (37 female; 18 – 31 years). They received course credit or financial compensation for 
their participation. All participants were right-handed and had normal to corrected-to-normal 
vision. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions. None of 
the participants took part in Study I. 
5.2.1.2. Experimental design, and procedure 
The experiment had a 2 (story: in-group vs. out-group) x 2 (hand colour: White vs. Black) x 2 
(compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) mixed model design, with story as between-subjects 
factor, and hand colour and compatibility as within-subjects factors. 
Participants read a short story about a law student and were instructed to take the 
perspective of the main character while reading. In the ‘in-group’ condition the main character 
was introduced as a white student from the Netherlands, in the ‘out-group’ condition as a black 
student from Suriname. After reading the story, all participants performed the same social Simon 
tasks described in Study I, with an animation of either a White hand or a Black hand.         
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5.2.2. Results 
All trials with RTs above 1500 ms or below 150 ms (7 trials, 0.4%) were excluded from further 
analysis. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the average RT of compatible trials 
from the average RT of incompatible trials. The RTs were log-transformed, but untransformed 
mean RTs are reported in ms. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the average RT of 
compatible trials from the average RT of incompatible trials. One participant with difference 
scores more than 2.5 SDs above the mean, and two participants with mean RTs were 3 SDs above 
the mean were excluded from further analysis.   
 A 2 (story: In-group vs. Out-group) x 2 (hand colour: White vs. Black) x 2 (compatibility: 
Compatible vs. Incompatible) GLM repeated measures analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of compatibility: participants were slower on incompatible trials (M = 386; SE = 6) than on 
compatible trials (M = 371; SE = 5), F(1,38) = 27.98, p = .001, ηρ² = .42. No effect of hand colour 
(F(1,38) = 1.28, p = .26), or any significant two-way interaction (all F‘s < 1) were found. As 
predicted, the three-way interaction was significant, F(1,38) = 4.26, p = .05, ηρ²= .10 (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Mean Reaction Times of the Social Simon Task During Interaction with a White Agent 
(a) and a Black Agent (b) as a Function of Story (In-group member vs. Out-group member) and 
Compatibility (Compatible vs. Incompatible Trials).  
 For both stories, a compatibility effect was obtained with a co-acting white agent, F(1,38) 
= 18.04, p = .001, ηρ²= .32 (Figure 3a); Participants were faster for compatible trials than on 
incompatible trials irrespective of taking the perspective of a in-group member or an out-group 
member (story in-group: t(20) = 3.43, p = .003; story out-group: t(18) = 2.60, p = .02). More 
importantly, the occurrence of a compatibility effect with a co-acting black agent depended on 
whether participants took the perspective of an in-group member or out-group member, F(1,38) = 
4.11, p = .05, ηρ²= .10 (Figure 3b). There was no compatibility effect for the black agent when 
participants read the story about an in-group member, t(20) < 1, n.s.. However, a compatibility 
effect was found when they read the story about an out-group member, t(18) = 4.14, p = .001. 
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5.3. General Discussion 
In the present research, we investigated whether action co-representation differs depending on 
group-membership of an interaction partner, and whether this difference could be overcome by 
taking the perspective of an out-group member. The results of our first study demonstrated that 
actions of out-group members are co-represented differently than actions of in-group members. 
While participants co-represent actions only for a white in-group member, they did not co-
represent actions of a black out-group member. In the second study, co-representation of an out-
group member’s action could be induced by instructing participants to take the perspective of an 
out-group member before performing the Simon task. Participants taking the perspective of an in-
group member still only co-represented actions of a white, but not of a black interaction partner. 
However, participants who first took the perspective of an out-group member showed  
compatibility effects when interacting with both a white agent and a black agent. 
Recent research showed that higher order processes have a strong influence on whether 
people co-represent actions of others or not (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; Hommel et al., 2009; 
Müller et al., 2011a). In line with these findings, we demonstrate that actions of out-group 
members are indeed co-represented substantially less than actions performed by in-group 
members. Depending on social factors like group-membership, the overlap between 
representations of one’s own actions and representation of actions of others are reduced. 
However, these differences in action co-representation are not stable but flexible, and can be 
eliminated by increasing perspective-taking between members from different social groups. 
Whereas prior literature already demonstrated a modulation of error-related brain activity during 
observation of actions performed by in-group vs. out-group members in a competitive context 
(Newmand-Norlund et al., 2009), and differences in motor cortex activation during observation 
of in-group vs. out-group members‘ actions (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010), the present findings 
extend these results by using different methods, and showing the same modulatory effect in the 
absence of a competitive context.  
Interestingly, it does not seem necessary to take the perspective of a specific out-group 
member for action co-representation to occur, but sufficient to take the perspective of any 
member of the out-group, as demonstrated in our second study. Indeed, previous literature 
demonstrated that the positive consequences of taking the perspective of one out-group member 
are generalised to the whole out-group (Aron et al., 1991; Batson et al., 1997). After taking the 
perspective of an out-group member, attitudes towards the out-group become more positive, and 
these changes in attitude can facilitate actual helping behaviour towards any member of the out-
group (Batson et al., 2002). 
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Perspective-taking increases both positivity towards an out-group, as well as self-other 
overlap with an out-group interaction partner (Batson et al., 1997). This raises the question of 
whether increased self-other overlap or increased positivity is responsible for our findings. Based 
on the literature, both explanations are possible: It has been argued that action co-representation 
partly depends on the perceived overlap of one’s representation of the self and the representation 
of the interaction partner (Müller et al., 2011a). In addition, recent research demonstrates that the 
valence of the interaction influences action co-representation (Hommel et al., 2009). However, a 
positive relationship with an interaction partner increases self-other overlap (Aron et al., 1991), 
and it seems difficult to disentangle positivity and self-other overlap as the possible underlying 
mechanism. Further research is definitely needed to clarify this issue.  
Another minor problem of the present research design might be that in-group/out-group 
membership correlates with a perceptible distinction, that is hand colour, so one might argue that 
our findings are influenced by these differences, and not purely by group membership. 
Specifically, effects of our first study could be due to the fact that the white hand was 
perceptually more similar to participants‘ own hand, which may minimise the compatibility effect 
during interaction with the black hand. Similarly, in study II, taking the perspective of a black 
person may prime participants to attend to the hand with a black skin colour. However, recent 
research suggests that group-membership, and not physical similarity or familiarity is primarily 
involved in influencing in-group biases (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010). Furthermore, 
comparable effects of perspective-taking have been found in the absence of differences in skin 
colour (Müller et al., 2011a).  
 Co-representation of our co-actors actions is an essential part in successful interaction 
(Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006), with people tending to more strongly co-represent 
actions of co-actors from the same in-group, with whom one has a positive relationship, and with 
whom one does not compete (e.g., Hommel et al., 2009). It is possible that to categorise another 
person as an in-group member might function as an enhanced indication that this person is a co-
actor, thereby triggering the tendency to co-represent his or her actions. While we cannot link the 
present findings to individual differences in prejudice, recent research has shown that individual 
levels of prejudice influences action co-representation for out-group members, demonstrating that 
people with higher levels of prejudice co-represent actions less than people with low levels of 
prejudice (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2009). The authors argue that because of these differences in action 
co-representation “empathy may be restricted to close others and, without active effort, may not 
extend to out-groups, making them likely targets of prejudice and discrimination“ (page S52). 
These findings are additionally underpinned by research revealing that co-representation of pain, 
as well as emotion recognition is also restricted to in-group members (Avenanti et al., 2010; 
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Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2002; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). The present research is, to the best 
of our knowledge, the first showing that perspective taking may offer a solution: taking the 
perspective of an out-group member not only decreases stereotype accessibility, and improves 
attitudes towards the out-group, but also improves coordination of actions on a very basic level, 
thereby improving social interactions.
 73 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Wesley van Pinxteren and Sarah Opsomer for their help in collecting the data, Jeroen 
Derks for creating the stimuli, and Jos Wittebrood and Pascal de Water for technical support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
 75 
 76 
References 
Allport, G. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Appel, M., & Richter, T. (2007). Persuasive effects of fictional narratives increase over time. 
Media Psychology, 10, 113-134. 
Aron A., Aron E. N., Tudor M., & Nelson G. (1991). Close relationships as including other in the 
self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 241-253. 
Aron A., McLaughlin-Volpe T., Mashek D., Lewandowski G., Wright S. C., & Aron E. N. 
(2005). Including others in the self. In: W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds). European 
review of social psychology. Psychology Press, Hove, E. Sussex, UK, pp. 101-132. 
Avenanti, A., Sirigu, A., & Aglioti, S. M. (2010). Racial bias reduces empathic sensorimotor 
resonance with other-race pain. Current Biology, 20, 1018-1022. 
Batson C. D., Polycarpou M. P., Harmon-Jones E., Imhoff H. J., Mitchener E. C., Bednar L. L. et 
al. (1997). Empathy and attitudes: Can feeling for a member of a stigmatized group 
improve feelings toward the group? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 
105-118. 
Batson C. D., Chang J., Orr R., & Rowland J. (2002). Empathy, attitudes, and action: Can feeling 
for a member of a stigmatized group motivate one to help the group? Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1656-1666.  
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal 
attachments  as a fundamental human motive. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 497-529. 
Blair, I. V. (2002). The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 6, 242–261. 
Böckler, A., & Zwickel, J. (in press). Influences of spontaneous perspective taking on spatial and 
identity processing of faces. Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience. 
Brass, M., Bekkering, H. & Prinz, W. (2001). Movement observation affects movement 
execution in a simple response task. Acta Psychologica, 106, 3-22. 
Brewer M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive motivational 
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307-324. 
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual-process model of impression formation. In T. K. Srull & R. S. 
Wyers (Eds.), Advances in social cognition: A dual process model of impression 
formation. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 77 
Buccino G., Lui F., Canessa N., Patteri I., Lagravinese G., Benuzzi F., Porro C.A., & Rizzolatti 
G. (2004). Neural circuits involved in the recognition of actions performed by non-
conspecifics: An fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 114-126. 
Burgoon, J. K., Bonito, J. A., Bengtsson, B., Cederberg, C., Lundeberg, M., & Allspach, L. 
(2000). Interactivity in human-computer interaction: A study of credibility, 
understanding, and influence. Computers in Human Behavior, 16, 553–574. 
Castelli F., Happé F., Frith U., & Frith C. (2000). Movement and mind: A functional imaging 
study  of perception and interpretation of complex intentional movement patterns. 
Neuroimage,  12, 314- 325. 
Cappella, J. N., & Panalp, S. (1981). Talk and silence sequences in informal conversations: III. 
 Interspeaker influence. Human Communication Research, 7, 117-132. 
Catmur, C., Walsh, V. & Heyes, C. (2007) Sensorimotor learning configures the human mirrory 
system. Current Biology, 17, 1527–1531. 
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception-behavior link and 
social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 893-910. 
Chartrand, T. L., Fitzsimons, G. M., & Fitzsimons, G. J. (2008). Automatic effects of 
anthropomorphized objects on behavior. Social Cognition, 26, 198-209. 
Chartrand, T. L., & van Baaren, R. B. (2009). Human Mimicry. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 41, 219-274. 
Costantini, M., Galati, G., Ferretti, A., Caulo, M., Tartaro, A., Romani, G. L., Aglioti, S. M. 
 (2005). Neural systems underlying observation of humanly impossible movements: 
 an fMRI study. Cerebral Cortex, 15, 1761–1767. 
Cross, E. S., Hamilton, de C., A. F., Kraemer, D. J. M., Kelley, W. M., Grafton, S. T. (2009). 
Dissociable substrates for body motion and physical experience in the human action 
observation network. European Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 1383-1392.   
Cross, E. S., Liepelt, R., Hamilton, de C., A. F., Parkinson, J., Ramsey, R., Stadler, W., & Prinz, 
W. (2011). Robotic movement preferentially engages the action observation network. 
Human Brain Mapping.  
Davis M. H., Conklin L., Smith A., & Luce C. (1996). Effects of perspective taking on the 
cognitive representation of persons: A merging of self and other. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 70, 713-726. 
 78 
Dijksterhuis, A., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). The perception-behavior expressway: Automatic effects 
of social perception on social behavior. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 
33, 1-40. 
Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M., & Grunedal, S. (2002). Facial reactions to emotional stimuli: 
 Automatically controlled emotional responses. Cognition & Emotion, 16, 449-471. 
Dittrich, K., Rothe, A., & Klauer, K. C. (2012). Increased spatial salience in the social Simon 
task: A response-coding account of spatial compatibility effects. Attention, Perception, 
& Psychophysics, 74, 911-929. 
Dolk, T., Hommel, B., Colzato, L. S., Schütz-Bosback, S., Prinz, W., & Liepelt, R. (2011). How 
social is the „social“ Simon effect? Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 1-9. 
Dolk, T., Hommel, B., Prinz, W., & Liepelt, R. (submitted). The (not so) Social Simon effect: A 
referential coding account. 
Dotsch, R., & Wigboldus, D. H. J. (2008). Virtual prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 44, 1194-1198. 
Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., &  Kawakami, K. (2002). Implicit and explicit prejudice and 
interracial interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 62-68. 
Elfenbein, H. A., & Ambady, N. (2002). On the universality and cultural specificity of emotion 
recognition: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 12, 203-235. 
Engel, A., Burke, M., Fiehler, K., Bien, S., Rösier, F. (2008). How moving objects become 
 animated: The human mirror neuron system assimilates non-biological movement 
 patterns. Social Neuroscience, 3, 368–387. 
Epley, N., Waytz, A., Akalis, S., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). When we need a human: Motivational 
determinants of anthropomorphism. Social Cognition, 26, 143-155. 
Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory of 
anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114, 864-886. 
Eyssel, F., & Hegel, F. (in press). (S)he‘s got the look: Gender stereotyping of robots. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology. 
Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: their 
meaning and uses. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 297–327. 
Galinsky, A. D., Ku, G., & Wang, C. S. (2005). Perspective-taking and self-other overlap: 
Fostering social bonds and facilitating social coordination. Group Processes and 
Intergroup Relations,  8, 109-124. 
 79 
Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype 
expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78, 708-724. 
Gazzola, V., Rizzolatti, G., Wicker, B., & Keysers, C. (2007). The anthropomorphic brain: The 
 mirror neuron system responds to human and robotic actions. NeuroImage, 35, 1674–
1684. 
Gobbini, M. I., Gertili, C., Ricciardi, E., Bellucci, C., Salvini, P., Laschi, C., Guazzelli, M., 
Pietrini, P. (2011). Distinct neural systems involved in agency and animacy detection. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 1911-1920. 
Goetz, J., Kiesler, S., & Powers, A. (2003). Matching robot appearance and behavior to tasks to 
improve human-robot cooperation. Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Workshop 
on Robot and Human Interactive Communication, 55-60. 
Gong, L. (2008). How social is social responses to computers? The function of the degree of  
 anthropomorphism in computer representations. Computers and Human Behavior, 24,  
 1494-1509. 
Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2000). The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of public 
narratives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 701-721. 
Green, M. C., Brock, T. C., & Kaufman, G. F. (2004). Understanding media enjoyment: The role 
of transportation into narrative worlds. Communication Theory, 14, 311-327. 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and 
 stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4–27. 
Guagnano, D., Rusconi, E., & Umiltà, C. A. (2010). Sharing a task or sharing a space? On the 
effect of the confederate in action coding in a detection task. Cognition, 114, 348-355. 
Gutsell, J. N., & Inzlicht, M. (2009). The closed circle of empathy: Observing outgroups does not 
result in sensorimotor mu suppression. Psychophysiology, 46, S51-S52. 
Gutsell, J. N., & Inzlicht, M. (2010). Empathy constrained: Prejudice predicts reduced mental 
simulation of actions during observation of outgroups. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 46, 841-845. 
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 10, 252-264. 
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., Rapson, R. L. (1992). Primitive emotional contagion. Review of 
Personal and Social Psychology, 14, 151–77. 
 80 
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., Rapson, R. L. (1994). Emotional Contagion. Cambidge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Heider, F., & Simmel, M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behavior. American Journal 
of Psychology, 57, 243-249. 
Heyes, C., Bird, G., Johnson, H., & Haggard, P. (2005). Experience modulates automatic 
imitation. Cognitive Brain Research, 22, 233-240.  
Hogeveen, J., & Obhi, S. S. (2012). Social interaction enhances motor resonance for observed 
human actions. Journal of Neuroscience, 32, 5984-5989. 
Hommel, B., Colzato, L. S., & van den Wildenberg, & W. P. M. (2009). How social are task 
representations? Psychological Science, 7, 794-798. 
Iacoboni, M., Lieberman, M. D., Knowlton, B. J., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Moritz, M., Throop, C. J., 
& Fiske, A. P. (2004). Watching social interactions produces dorsomedial prefrontal and 
 medial parietal BOLD fMRI signal increases compared to a resting baseline. NeuroImage, 
 21, 1167–1173. 
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York, NY: Holt. 
Kiesler, S., & Goetz, J. (2002). Mental models and cooperation with robotic assistants. 
Proceedings of CHI’02 on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 576–577. 
Kilner, J., Hamilton, A., Blakemore, S.-J. (2007). Interference effect of observed human 
movement on action is due to velocity profile of biological motion. Social Neuroscience, 
2, 158–166. 
Kilner, J. M., Paulignan, Y., & Blakemore, S. J. (2003). An interference effect of observed 
biological movement on action. Current Biology, 13, 522-525. 
Knoblich, G., & Sebanz, N. (2006). The social nature of perception and action. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 15, 99-104. 
Krach, S., Hegel, F., Wrede, B., Sagerer, G., Binkofski, F., & Kircher, T. (2008). Can machines 
think? Interaction and perspective taking with robots investigated via fMRI. PLoS ONE, 
3(7), e2597. 
LaFrance, M. (1982). Posture mirroring and rapport. In M. Davis (Ed.), Interaction rhythms: 
 Periodicity in commutative behavior. New York: Human Sciences Press. 
Leslie, A. M. (1994). ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity. In L. 
A. Hirschfeld, and S. A. Gelman (Eds). Mapping the Mind: Domain specificity in 
cognition and culture. Cambridge University Press. 
 81 
Liepelt, R., & Brass, M. (2010). Top-down modulation of motor priming by belief about 
animacy. Experimental Psychology, 57, 221-227. 
Lozano, S. C., Hard, B. M., & Tversky, B. (2006). Perspective taking promotes action 
understanding and learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 32, 1405-1421. 
Luola, F., Prasad, S., Harber, K., & Shiffrar, M. (2005). Recognizing people from their 
movement. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
31, 210-220. 
Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking categorically about 
others. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 93-120. 
Marin, L., Issartel, J., & Chaminade, T. (2009). Interpersonal motor coordination From human – 
 human to human–robot interactions. Interaction Studies, 3, 479-504. 
Mitchell, R. W., Thompson, N. S., & Miles, H. L. (Eds.). (1997). Anthropomorphism, anecdotes, 
 and animals. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Miura, N., Sugiura, M., Takahashi, M., Sassa, Y., Miyamoto, A., Sato, S., Horie, K., Nakamura, 
K., & Kawashima, R. (2010). Effect of motion smoothness on brain activity while 
observing a dance: an fMRI study using a humanoid robot. Social Neuroscience, 5, 40–
58. 
Morewedge, C. K., Preston, J., & Wegner, D. M. (2007). Timescale bias in the attribution of 
mind. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 1-11. 
Mori, M. (1970). The uncanny valley. Energy, 7, 33-35. 
Müller, B. C. N., Brass, M., Kühn, S., Tsai, C.-C., Nieuwboer, W., Dijksterhuis, A., & van 
Baaren, R. B. (2011a). When Pinocchio acts like a human, a wooden hand becomes 
embodied. Action co-representation for non-biological agents. Neuropsychologia, 49, 
1373-1377. 
Müller, B. C. N., Kühn, S., van Baaren, R. B., Dotsch, R., Brass, M., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2011b). 
Perspective taking eliminates differences in co-representation of out-group members’ 
actions. Experimental Brain Research, 211, 423-428. 
Newman-Norlund, R. D., Ganesh, S., van Shie, H. T., de Bruijn, E. R. A., Bekkering, H. (2009). 
Self-identification and empathy modulate error-related brain activity during the 
observation of penalty shots between friend and foe. Social, Cognitive, and Affective 
Neuroscience, 4, 10-22. 
 82 
Oberman, L. M. , McCleery, J. P., Ramachandran, V. S., & Pineda, J. A. (2007). EEG evidence 
for mirror neuron activity during the observation of human and robot actions: Towards an 
 analysis of the human qualities of interactive robots. Neurocomputing, 70, 2194–2203. 
Press, C. (2011). Action observation and robotic agents: Learning and anthropomorphism. 
 Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35, 1410-1418. 
Preston, S. D., de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. Behavioral 
Brain Sciences, 25, 1-72. 
Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and action planning. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 9, 
129-154. 
Ramnani, N., & Miall, R. C. (2004). A system in the human brain for predicting the actions of 
others. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 85-90. 
Ramsey, R., & Hamilton de C., A. F. (2010). Triangles have goals too: Understanding action 
representation in lef aIPS. Neuropsychologia, 48, 2773-2776. 
Ruys, K. I. & Aarts, H. (2010). When competition merges people’s behavior: Interdependency 
 activates shared action representations, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 
 1130-1133 
Saygin, A. P., Chaminade, T., Ishiguro, H., Driver, J., & Frith, C. (2012). The thing that should 
not be: predictive coding and the uncanny valley in perceiving human and humanoid robot 
actions. Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 413-422. 
Schneider, E. F., Lang, A., Shin, M., & Bradley, S. D. (2004). Death with a story: How story 
impacts emotional, motivational, and physiological responses to first-person shooter video 
games. Human Communication Research, 30, 361-375. 
Schultz, J., Friston, K. J., O‘Doherty, J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2005). Activation in 
posterior superior temporal sulcus parallels parameter inducing the percept of animacy. 
Neuron, 45, 625-635. 
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and minds moving 
together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 70-76. 
Sebanz, N., Knoblich, G., & Prinz, W. (2003). Representing others’ actions: Just like one’s own? 
Cognition, 8, 11-21. 
Sebanz, N., Knoblich, G., & Prinz, W. (2005). How to share a task: Corepresenting stimulus-
response mappings. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 31, 1234-1246. 
 83 
Seyama, J., & Nagayama, R. (2007). The uncanny valley: Effect of realism on the impression of 
 artificial human faces. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 16, 337-51. 
Smith, E. R., Henry, S. (1996). An ingroup becomes part of the self: Response time evidence. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 635-642. 
Stanley, J., Gowen, E., & Miall, R. C. (2007). Effects of agency on movement interference during 
 observation of a moving dot stimulus. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
 Perception and Performance, 33, 915–926. 
Steckenfinger, S.A., & Ghazanfar, A.A. (2009). Monkey visual behavior falls into the uncanny 
 valley. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA, 106, 18362-6. 
Stenzel A., Chinellato E., Tirado Bou M. A., del Pobil Á. P., Lappe M., & Liepelt R. (in press) 
When humanoid robots become human-like interaction partners: Co-representation of 
robotic actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance. 
Stürmer, B., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. (2000). Correspondence effects with manual gestures 
 and postures: A study of imitation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 26, 1746–1759. 
Tai, Y. F., Scherfler, C., Brooks, D. J. Sawamoto, N., & Castiello, U. (2004). The human 
premotor cortex is ‘mirror’ only for biological actions. Current Biology, 14, 117-120.  
Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal of Social Issues, 25, 79-97. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & 
S. Worchel (Eds). The social psychology of intergroup relations. Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole 
Teufel, C., Fletcher, P. C., & Davis, G. (2010). Seeing other minds: Attributed mental states 
influence perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 376-382. 
Tsai, C.-C., & Brass, M. (2007). Does the human motor system simulates Pinocchio’s actions? 
Coaction with a human hand versus a wooden hand in a dyadic interaction. Psychological 
Science, 18, 1058-1062.  
Tsai, C.-C., Kuo, W.-J., Hung, D. L., & Tzeng, O. J. L. (2008). Action co-representation is tuned 
to other humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 2015-2024. 
Tsai, C.-C., Kuo, W.-J., Jing, J.-T., Hung, D. L., & Tzeng, O. J. L. (2006). A common coding 
framework in self-other interaction: Evidence from joint action task. Experimental Brain 
Research, 175, 353-362. 
 84 
Verkuyten, M., Thijs, J. (2002). Racist victimization among children in The Netherlands: The 
effect of ethnic group and school. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25, 310-331. 
Waytz, A., Gray, K., Epley, N., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). Causes and consequences of mind 
perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 383-388. 
Webb, J. T. (1972). Interview Synchrony: An Investigation of Two Speech Rate Measures. In 
 A.W. Siegman and B. Pope (Eds.) Studies in Dyadic Communication. New York: 
 Pergamon Press. 
Welsh, T. N., Higgins, L., Ray, M., & Weeks, D. J. (2007). Seeing vs. Believing: Is believing 
sufficient to activate the processes of response co-representation? Human Movement 
Science, 26, 853-866.  
Wheatley, T., Milleville, S. C., & Martin, A. (2007). Understanding animate agents: Distinct 
roles for the social network and mirror system. Psychological Science, 18, 469-474. 
Wilson, M., & Knoblich, G. (2005). The case of motor involvement in perceiving conspecifics. 
Psychological Bulletin, 131, 460-473. 
Xu, X., Zuo, X., Wang, X., & Han, S. (2009). Do you feel my pain? Racial group membership 
modulates empathic neural responses, Journal of Neuroscience, 29, 8525-8529.
 85 
 86 
Samenvatting in het Nederlands 
Mensen zijn sociale dieren, ons dagelijks leven brengen we grotendeels met anderen mensen 
door. Het is daarom belangrijk dat we in staat zijn om onze handelingen met de handelingen van 
mensen om ons heen te coördineren; zo zijn we in staat om succesvolle sociale interacties te 
bereiken. Om samen iets te doen, bijvoorbeeld een zwaar object te dragen of samen te koken, 
moeten we kunnen voorspellen wat een ander van plan is. Zonder deze inschatting zijn we minder 
in staat om te reageren op die persoon, en is het waarschijnlijk dat je het doel dat je wilt bereiken 
niet volbrengt. In de literatuur wordt de coördinatie van handelingen tussen twee personen actie 
co-representatie genoemd. Hierbij wordt aangenomen dat dezelfde hersengebieden actief zijn bij 
zowel de verwerking van geobserveerde acties, als bij het uitvoeren van acties: de observatie van 
handelingen van iemand anders leidt daardoor tot activatie van motor representaties in de 
observator. Verondersteld wordt dat het menselijke brein gespecialiseerd is om handelingen van 
anderen mensen waar te nemen, te interpreteren, en een passende response voor te bereiden en uit 
te voeren. Echter zijn we ook continu in interactie met niet-levende objecten, denk bijvoorbeeld 
aan een computer, een smartphone, of je interactieve navigatiesysteem. De interacties met deze 
apparaten worden steeds belangrijker. Twee belangrijke vragen daarbij zijn: 1) hoe is het 
mogelijk dat mensen met deze objecten om kunnen gaan? en 2) Hoe kan men de interacties met 
deze niet levende objecten optimaliseren?  
In eerder onderzoek is aangetoond dat mensen automatisch, menselijke eigenschappen 
toeschrijven aan objecten om het „gedrag“ van deze objecten te verklaren, een fenomeen wat 
antropomorfisme genoemd wordt. Als de computer niet fatsoenlijk werkt zeggen we bijvoorbeeld 
snel: „hij is vandaag wat chagrijnig“, dus we doen zo alsof het een daadwerkelijk persoon is. 
Maar als onze interacties met objecten vergelijkbaar zijn met interacties met mensen, hoe co-
representeren we dan handelingen van objecten zodat we succesvol met deze kunnen 
interacteren? Is het mogelijk dat we acties van objecten op dezelfde manier co-representeren als 
acties van mensen? En beïnvloeden objecten ons sociaal gedrag afhankelijk van of we ze als 
menselijk waarnemen of niet? In het huidige proefschrift wordt de vraag onderzocht hoe mensen 
acties van niet-menselijke agents co-representeren en wat de sociale moderatoren zijn die actie 
co-representatie beïnvloeden.  
Onderzoek heeft gesuggereerd dat actie co-representaties alleen bij interacties met 
anderen mensen gebeurd. Wij laten echter in hoofdstuk 2 zien dat co-representaties niet alleen 
voor mensen optreden, maar ook voor niet-menselijke agents zoals bijvoorbeeld Pinocchio. 
Deelnemers die de kans kregen om menselijke intenties toe te schrijven aan Pinocchio door een 
filmpje te zien waarin hij zich menselijk gedraagt co-representeerden zijn handelingen op een 
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latere tijdstip. Dit was niet het geval bij deelnemers die geen Pinocchio filmpje vooraf te zien 
kregen. Dus het verschil wat in de literatuur tussen menselijke en niet-menselijke handelingen 
gemaakt wordt is niet adequaat om gevonden verschillen in actie co-representatie te verklaren; 
het gaat meer om intentionele of niet-intentionele acties. Door te zien dat een niet-menselijke 
agent zoals Pinocchio intentioneel handelt wordt deze agent menselijker, wat tot co-
representaties van zijn handelingen leidt.  
In hoofdstuk 3 werd de invloed van antropomorfisme op betekenisvol sociaal gedrag 
onderzocht. We konden aantonen dat de mogelijkheid om menselijke eigenschappen toe te 
schrijven aan een niet-menselijke agent leidt tot meer pro-sociaal gedrag. Deelnemers die van 
tevoren een filmpje van Pinocchio te zien kregen waarin hij zich intentioneel gedraagt gingen 
vervolgens dichter bij een Pinocchio-pop zitten dan bij een andere deelnemer. Verder werden ze 
gevraagd om geld op te delen tussen Pinocchio en een echte persoon. Het bleek dat deelnemers 
net zo veel geld gaven aan Pinocchio dan aan een echte persoon. Dit is bijzonder interessant, 
aangezien het voor deelnemers op een bewust en rationeel niveau duidelijk moet zijn dat dit 
gedrag niet heel logisch is. Blijkbaar is het zo dat als we opgaan in een verhaal over een 
intentionele niet-menselijke agent, antropomorfisme makkelijk deze rationele overwegingen kan 
overwinnen. Uiteindelijk kan dit leiden tot sociaal gedrag, het delen van middelen, met een niet-
levend object. 
Hoofdstuk 4 houdt zich met de vraag bezig of menselijke uiterlijke kenmerken nodig zijn 
om actie co-representaties te activeren, en in hoeverre perspectief nemen daarbij een rol speelt. In 
dit hoofdstuk konden we aantonen dat handelingen van abstracte vormen zoals een driehoek, die 
dus helemaal geen menselijke uiterlijke kenmerken hebben, ook co-representaties kunnen 
oproepen. Daarbij is het van bijzonder belang dat mensen van tevoren de mogelijkheid hebben 
om de perspectief te kunnen nemen van het object. We veronderstellen dat de daaruit resulterende 
overlap tussen zelf en ander leidt tot meer actie co-representaties.  
De invloed van de overlap tussen zelf en ander wordt in hoofdstuk 5 verder onderzocht.  
Groepslidmaatschap is een belangrijke indicator in sociale interacties. Daarbij kon aangetoond 
worden dat wanneer een interactiepartner geen lid is van onze eigen groep, er ook geen co-
representatie plaats vind. Echter, als deelnemers de mogelijkheid kregen om het perspectief te 
nemen van iemand die niet tot onze groep behoort, en zich in konden leven in zijn/haar verhaal, 
dan co-representeerden ze de acties van deze persoon achteraf op dezelfde manier alsof het een 
actief was van een groepslid. Het perspectief nemen van een buitenstaander kan helpen om op 
een heel basaal niveau de coördinatie van acties tussen leden van verschillende groepen te 
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verhogen. Op deze manier zou het ook mogelijk kunnen zijn om problemen als verminderde 
empathische reacties voor buitenstaander te veranderen respectievelijk te verhogen.   
Samen laten de studies in de huidige dissertatie van de eerste die de invloed van sociale 
factoren op actie co-representaties verduidelijken. Door het toeschrijven van menselijke 
eigenschappen worden interacties met niet-menselijke agents op een basaal niveau verbeterd, wat 
invloed kan hebben op ons sociaal gedrag. 
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